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In essence, rather than portend the death of the punitive damage 
class action, the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence creates 
powerful new arguments in favor of the aggregate model of 
punitive damage adjudication that offers a route back towards 
the viable use of class actions in mass tort scenarios.1 
The work begins anew.  The hope rises again.  And the dream 
lives on.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of the punitive damage class has a long and dubious 
lineage, extending back more than thirty years.3  During the 1980s and, 
especially, the 1990s the concept of the punitive damage class excited 
plaintiffs’ attorneys,4 inspired countless academics,5 riveted at least a few 
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 1. James M. Underwood, Road to Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-Turn? The Intersection of 
Punitive Damage Class Actions and the Due Process Clause, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763, 763 
(2009). 
 2. Senator Edward Kennedy, Remarks at the Democratic National Convention, (August 25, 
2008) (transcript available at http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/conventions/videos 
/transcripts/20080825_KENNEDY_SPEECH.html). 
 3. See e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979) (disapproving 
proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class) vacated, 100 F.F.D. 336 (D. Mass. 1983) 
(vacating Rule 23(b)(3) class); Abed v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD 
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Dalkon Shield]. 
 4. See e.g., Elizabeth Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of 
Punitive Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 979, 982 (2001) (“The use of the class mechanism to determine and distribute 
punitive damages brings rationality and proportionality to the process and achieves more equitable 
and socially palatable results.”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Robert J. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of 
Punitive Damage Issues After Philip Morris v. Williams: We Can Get There from Here, 2 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 407, 430 (2008) (urging that the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 presents 
“an intriguing format for cost-effective determination of punitive damages liability and quantum to 
large numbers of plaintiffs in a single proceeding”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Thomas M. Sobol, 
Equity for the Victims, Equity for the Transgressor: The Classwide Treatment of Punitive Damages 
Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2005, 2006 (2000); Thomas M. Sobol & Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Complex 
Litigation: Punitive Damages Class II, NAT’L L.J., March 6, 2000, at A17 (“At least in the mass tort 
context, therefore, in which the number of claimants is large, the pool of available punitive damage 
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defense counsel,6 and caught the attention of a scattering of federal 
judges.7  Nonetheless, certification of actual punitive damage classes has 
proved elusive, as court after court refused to give their imprimatur to the 
punitive damage class.8  In truth, the history of the punitive damage class 
has been one of repeated repudiation, punctuated by scattered, 
anomalous success (a point which its advocates have difficulty 
acknowledging).9 
                                                                                                                       
dollars may be a classic ‘limited fund’ warranting ‘limited punishment’ through 23(b)(1)(B) 
certification for a single punitive damages trial, or a comprehensive settlement of punitive damages 
liability.”). 
 5. There is a sizeable literature on punitive damages and class litigation that was generated 
during the 1980s and 1990s.  See generally Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of State 
Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275 (1999); Kevin 
M. Forde, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Cases: Recovery on Behalf of a Class, 15 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 397 (1984); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic 
Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the 
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); Dennis Neil Jones et al., Multiple 
Punitive Damages Awards for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National 
Policy to Protect Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1991); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing 
Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982); Mark 
Donald Peters, Comment, Punitive Damages, the Common Question Class Action, and the Concept 
of Overkill, 13 PAC. L.J. 1273 (1982); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: 
An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998); Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive 
Damages: A Comment, 39 VILL. L. REV. 415 (1994); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass 
Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 
37 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for 
Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269 (1983). 
 6. See e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reigning in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”: Proposals 
for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003 (1999). 
 7. See e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(Judge Jack B. Weinstein certifying Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class in Agent Orange 
litigation); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 
U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 290 (1991) (“No matter how financially healthy [mass tort defendants may be], 
the sheer number of present and future victims means that we are ultimately dealing with a limited 
compensation fund.”). 
 8. See e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1005–06 (3d Cir. 1986); In re 
Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 
F.2d 1175, 1184 (8th Cir. 1982); Dalkon Shield, supra note 3, 693 F.2d at 852; In re Rail Collision 
Near Chase, Md., on Jan. 4, 1987 Litig., 9 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1045 (D. Md. Dec. 8, 1987); 
Payton, 83 F.R.D. at 389. 
 9. See e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) 
(dismissing challenge to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class certification as not appealable; In 
re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) (refusing to decertify the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class certified in the Agent Orange litigation); Agent Orange, 100 
F.R.D. at 718; In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 591 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d sub nom., Watson 
v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 
657–58 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (approving trial plan for determining classwide liability for punitive 
damages, with individual award determinations in subsequent trial phases), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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The punitive damage class’s Waterloo, however, clearly arrived with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.10—
celebrated, or at least commemorated in this symposium.  Because the 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund class category has been the usual 
procedural vehicle for the punitive damage class,11 the Court’s exacting 
requirements for certification of a limited-fund class action in Ortiz 
foredoomed almost every subsequent attempt to certify a punitive 
damage class. 
And yet, as we shall see, the punitive damage class has proved 
enduring and hard to stave off.  Hence, the Supreme Court’s string of 
punitive damage cases,12 decided in the 1990s and into the twenty-first 
century, breathed new life into the moribund idea of the punitive damage 
class.  The Court’s suggestions of constitutional constraints on punitive 
damage awards provided a basis for advancing the argument for the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund.  Seizing this jurisprudence, Judge Jack 
Weinstein cobbled together an innovative theory to undergird 
certification of a punitive damage class in In re Simon II Litigation,13 
thus providing renewed hope to the advocates of the punitive damage 
class.14  Nevertheless, in 2005—more than twenty-five years after the 
first suggestion of a punitive damage class—the Second Circuit 
unceremoniously buried the punitive damage class once again.15 
                                                     
 10. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 11. See Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 422 (“Class actions focusing on punitive damages 
claims have most frequently sought certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B), commonly 
known as the ‘limited fund’ provision.”).  Some punitive damage classes have been sought and 
certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), but these examples are somewhat anomalous.  See infra Part 
II.B.1.  Even fewer punitive damage classes have been pursued under Rule 23(b)(2), the class 
category for injunctive and declaratory relief.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 12. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus. v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 
(1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 
499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 13. 211 F.R.D. 86, 163–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 14. There has been a revival of interest in the punitive damage class since the Court decided 
Ortiz.  See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 4; Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4; Jeffrey L. Fisher, The 
Exxon Valdez Case and Regularizing Punishment, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (2009); Laura J. Hines, 
Obstacles to Determining Punitive Damages in Class Actions, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889 
(2001); Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive 
Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1114 (2004); Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive 
Damage Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 943 (2001); Aileen L. 
Nagy, Note, Certifying Mandatory Punitive Damages Classes in a Post-Ortiz and State Farm World, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2005); Joan Steinman, Managing Punitive Damages: A Role for Mandatory 
“Limited Generosity” Classes and Anti-Suit Injunctions?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1043 (2001); 
Symposium, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: Lessons in State Class Actions, Punitive 
Damages, and Jury Decision-Making, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001); Underwood, supra 
note 1. 
 15. In re Simon II Litig. 407 F.3d 125, 136–40 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Second Circuit did 
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One would think that the combined Ortiz and Simon II decisions 
definitively would have interred the punitive damage class forever.  But 
this has turned out not to be entirely true.  In July 2006, the Fifth Circuit 
upheld class certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage 
settlement class, brought on behalf of individuals who took out loans and 
bought insurance from Washington Mutual Finance Group in 
Mississippi.16  Applying an Ortiz-like analysis in a scant three-page 
decision, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court had not abused 
its discretion in finding that a limited fund existed to support certification 
of a punitive damage class.17  Notably, the Fifth Circuit’s decision was 
not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter, and therefore enjoys 
questionable precedential authority. 
Since that Fifth Circuit unpublished decision, it is difficult to find a 
single reported decision where a federal court has certified a Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund punitive damage class.18  Nonetheless, in the 
groves of academe and among plaintiffs’ counsel, the punitive damage 
                                                                                                                       
acknowledge, however, its prior approval, in the Agent Orange litigation, of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
punitive damage class.  Id. at 132 n.5.  However, other commentators have interpreted the Court’s 
series of punitive damages cases to “spell the death knell for the punitive damage class action.”  E.g., 
Underwood, supra note 1, at 779. 
 16. Baker v. Washington Mut. Fin. Group, 193 F. App’x 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 17. Id. at 297.  This action involved a settlement class, rather than a litigation class.  The 
settlement did not provide for injunctive or declaratory relief.  Rather, the settlement established a $7 
million fund for class members who filed claims forms.  The agreement designated $3.5 million for 
compensatory damages and $3.5 million for punitive damages.  The settlement, certified by the 
district court under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), permitted class members to opt out of the compensatory 
portion of the settlement, but did not permit class members to opt out of the punitive damage portion 
of the agreement.  The district court relied on the Supreme Court’s punitive damage decisions, 
construing a constitutional limit on aggregate punitive damages.  Id.  The settlement was challenged 
by intervenors, who argued that the settlement did not satisfy the requirements of Ortiz.  The 
intervenors contended that the $3.5 million punitive damage number must have been “plucked out of 
thin air.”  Id. at 298.  In upholding the certification, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, but did not rely on 
the line of punitive damage decisions setting forth constitutional constraints of such awards.  The 
Fifth Circuit concluded: 
The district court accepted both of [the defendant’s] arguments and held that a limited 
fund existed both legally and factually.  We need not address the district court’s legal 
finding that substantive due process and its ban on excessive punitive damages can create 
a limited fund because the district court’s factual finding that a limited fund existed was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 297.  Notably, the Fifth Circuit made no reference to the Second Circuit’s decision in Simon II, 
most likely because the Fifth Circuit eschewed reliance on the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
punitive damage decisions to hold that the settlement satisfied Ortiz’s requirements for a limited-
fund punitive damage class. 
 18. This is not to suggest that such classes have not been certified.  Instead, analysis of class 
certification issues has always been complicated by the fact that reported decisions may not reflect 
the true universe of judicial orders, or may present a distorted portrait of actual practice.  Moreover, 
with regard to punitive damage class certification, analysts and commentators are compelled to make 
arguments from very small samples of reported decisions. 
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class seems to enjoy the feline attribute of multiple lives.  Hence, one 
academic commentator recently authored a strenuous defense of the 
punitive damage class that, he claims, “offers a route back towards the 
viable use of class actions in mass tort scenarios.”19  In addition, 
distinguished plaintiffs’ mass-tort attorneys (and tireless advocates for 
the punitive damage class) have suggested revitalized support for the 
punitive damage class pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA).20 
For those who have lived through thirty years of mass-tort litigation, 
this renewed advocacy on behalf of the punitive damage class presents a 
rather intriguing, if not preposterous, prospect.  The renewed arguments 
in favor of the punitive damage class take three forms.  First, it is urged 
that courts take an expansive view of the Supreme Court’s holdings in 
both Ortiz and Phillip Morris USA v. Williams,21 and interpret such 
decisions to support certification of punitive classes under Rule 
23(b)(3).22  Second, other commentators suggest that the Supreme Court 
ought to grant review of a certified 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class, in 
order to create a specific exception to Ortiz that would authorize courts 
to certify punitive damage classes under 23(b)(1)(B).23  Third, plaintiffs’ 
                                                     
 19. Underwood, supra note 1, at 764.  Resuscitating the punitive damage class also seems to be 
a favorite subject among law-school students.  A Columbia University law student has attempted to 
revive the punitive damage class by suggesting how the Supreme Court could reconcile its decisions 
in both Ortiz and Campbell.  See Nagy, supra note 14, at 629 (“Fairness to both plaintiffs and 
defendants, combined with the desire for efficiency in the resolution of mass tort cases, suggests a 
need for change.  Unconstrained by explicit language in Ortiz that prohibits certification of 
mandatory punitive damage classes, the Supreme Court is in a position to carve out an exception 
from the traditional application of 23(b)(1)(B) for punitive damage classes, allowing certification to 
accommodate the interests of defendants and plaintiffs alike.”).  In her Note, Ms. Nagy draws most 
of her authoritative support for her analysis and conclusions from the writings of Elizabeth Cabraser, 
a prominent plaintiffs’ attorney and longstanding advocate for court certification of punitive damage 
classes. 
Another Columbia Law School student similarly has urged the marriage of the Supreme Court’s 
punitive damage jurisprudence to the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class: 
The debate over the punitive damage class could not be more important, or more timely.  
At a moment when corporations wield the sort of social power previously considered the 
exclusive province of government, the need for clarification on the punitive damages case 
law is becoming ever more pressing.  The punitive damages class action is a unique tool 
enabling individuals and communities to negotiate their relationships with private 
entities.  This procedural mechanism has the potential to alter radically the landscape of 
mass tort litigation. 
Mesulam, supra note 14, at 1118 (citations omitted). 
 20. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 430. 
 21. 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (stating that in a non class action setting, the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution prohibits juries from basing a punitive damage award on a desire to 
punish a defendant for injuries inflicted upon non parties to the dispute). 
 22. Underwood, supra note 1, at 796–807.  See also infra Part IV.B. 
 23. Nagy, supra note 14, at 624–29.  See also infra Part IV.A. 
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attorneys argue that CAFA opens the door to creative use of the punitive 
damage class through the law’s authorization for “mass-action” cases.24 
This Article examines these theories currently urged in support of the 
punitive damage class and assesses whether there actually is a viable 
means of sustaining a punitive damage class in the post-Ortiz, post-
Simon II class action era.  The Article concludes that prevailing class 
action jurisprudence, integrated with the Court’s punitive damage 
jurisprudence, is unlikely to support certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) 
punitive damage class.  In addition, the Supreme Court is extremely 
unlikely to create an Ortiz exception for punitive damage classes.  
Finally, the article suggests that CAFA cannot and does not support any 
Congressional intent to approve punitive damage classes as “mass 
actions” under this new jurisdictional statutory scheme. 
II. THIRTY YEARS OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLASS CONCEPT: A 
VERY SHORT HISTORY 
A. Early Ventures in the Punitive Damage Class 
The history of the punitive damage class is worth at least some 
cursory review, if for no other reason than to note the scarcity of the 
record and the thinness of doctrinal analysis.  The history of the punitive 
damage class centers on a small cluster of reported decisions that are 
largely devoid of a meaningful jurisprudence.  Nonetheless, the concept 
of the punitive damage class has managed to seize the imaginations of 
numerous academics and the plaintiffs’ bar.  As will be seen, advocates 
on both sides of the debate have constructed elaborate arguments based 
on slim and insubstantial precedent. 
The concept of the punitive damage class was first forged in the 
heyday of mass-tort litigation, during the 1980s and 1990s when federal 
courts were inundated with massive tort and products-liability litigation.  
This era marked a “mass-tort litigation” crisis in federal and state courts, 
when parties and the judiciary were uncertain how to adjudicate massive, 
complex tort litigation and, therefore, were engaged in substantial 
innovative, experimental efforts to resolve the litigation crisis.  Among 
many proposed novel techniques for resolving mass torts, the punitive 
damage class emerged as a potential vehicle for resolving aggregate 
punitive liability on a classwide basis. 
                                                     
 24. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 430–31.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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Nonetheless, the concept of a punitive damage class was a novel 
idea.  As such, the punitive damage class presented challenges for the 
pleader and for the courts: how should a plaintiff seek class certification 
of a punitive damage class under Rule 23, and what was required for 
valid class certification?  We may surmise that plaintiffs’ attorneys were 
uncertain how to proceed because the cases during this period reflect that 
some counsel sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3)―the damage opt-
out class―while others sought class certification under 23(b)(1)(B).25  
We may further deduce that the punitive damage class was something of 
a litigation novelty because plaintiffs’ attorneys frequently made little 
effort (or certainly insufficient effort) to provide the court with an 
evidentiary record in support of certification of the punitive damage 
class.26 
One need not dwell very long on the judicial reception to the 
punitive damage class prior to Ortiz because there are scant decisions 
relating to class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and even 
fewer focusing on certification of a punitive damage class.  Moreover, in 
the few instances where plaintiffs sought certification of a 23(b)(1)(B) 
punitive damage class, courts rarely provided an extensive discussion of 
their rationales for denying or granting certification.  Hence, prior to 
Ortiz, it is perhaps fair to suggest that there was no considered 
jurisprudence relating to the 23(b)(1)(B) class generally or to the punitive 
damage class specifically.27  Rather, the reported decisions comprised a 
hodge-podge collection of cursory review by scattered courts. 
                                                     
 25. See In re Exxon Valdez, 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) (noting 
that the district court certified a mandatory class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming classwide treatment of 
compensatory and punitive damage claims in landfill contamination action under 23(b)(3); 
compensatory damage claims tried first, followed by classwide punitive damages); In re “Agent 
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721–25 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that plaintiffs sought 
certification of a class under Rules 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(3), and mandatory class certification 
pursuant to 23(b)(1)(B)).  But see In re Copley Pharmaceutical Inc., “Albuterol” Prods. Liab. Litig., 
161 F.R.D. 456, 467–68 (D. Wyo. 1995) (finding certification of a punitive damage class under Rule 
23(b)(3) inappropriate because punitive damages must relate to particular plaintiff). 
 26. During the first decade of mass-tort litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys tended a scattershot 
approach to class certification, seeking certification under all provisions of Rule 23(b)(1)(A), 
(b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and (b)(3).  Because the law was unsettled, there seemed to be a sense that class 
counsel should plead everything to see what would stick with the courts.  In this spirit, the era’s thin 
pleadings on Rule 23 punitive damage classes reflect both uncertainty in the law as well as a half-
hearted cover-all-bases approach to pleading. 
 27. Prior to Ortiz, the most extensive attempt to articulate some jurisprudential basis for a 
punitive damage class may be found in the Third Circuit’s decision In re School Asbestos Litigation, 
789 F.2d 996, 1003–08 (3d Cir. 1986) (providing a lengthy discussion of purpose of punitive 
damages and possible rationales for certifying a punitive damage class). 
0.6.0_MULLENIX FINAL 5/10/2010  12:38:28 PM 
852 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
With a few limited exceptions noted below, plaintiffs’ attempts to 
certify punitive damage classes prior to Ortiz were largely unsuccessful.  
Courts routinely rejected proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(B) damage classes for 
at least five reasons: (1) insufficient proof of a limited fund, (2) 
impermissible violation of the federal Anti-Injunction Act, (3) applicable 
law problems, (4) existence of an under-inclusive class, and (5) 
impermissible circumvention of the bankruptcy laws. 
The most frequently cited reason for denial of a proposed Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class was the failure of the proponents 
either to provide the court with any evidence of the limited fund, or the 
plaintiffs’ failure in providing sufficient evidence of the limited fund.28  
Prior to Ortiz, federal courts split concerning what standard of proof a 
proponent of a limited-fund class needed to satisfy in order for a court to 
certify such a class.29  Some courts held that the proponent of the limited 
fund needed to show that a limited fund would “necessarily” affect the 
other plaintiffs’ claims.30  Other federal courts suggested that the 
proponents needed merely to show that there was a “substantial 
probability” that a limited fund would affect other class members’ 
rights.31 
However, federal courts agreed that, irrespective of the proper test, a 
district court as a matter of law had to make a fact-finding inquiry on the 
question of the existence of a limited fund, and that the failure to do so 
constituted judicial error in certifying a class.32  Moreover, the party 
opposing class certification had to be afforded an opportunity to dispute 
whether there was a limited fund.33  Clearly, this prior debate concerning 
                                                     
 28. See, e.g., In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he 
district court, as a matter of law, must have a fact-finding inquiry [on the issue of a limited fund] and 
allow opponents of class certification to present evidence that a limited fund does not exist.  Because 
the district judge . . . failed to make any such finding, the certification was clearly erroneous as a 
matter of law.” (citations omitted)); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 83 F.R.D. 382, 389 (D. Mass. 1979) 
(“The plaintiffs do not, however, offer evidence of the likely insolvency of the defendants, and I do 
not believe that, without more, numerous plaintiffs and a large ad damnum clause should guarantee 
(b)(1)(B) certification.”); cf. Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1003–05 (stating that plaintiffs 
presented no evidence that the defendants’ available assets would be insufficient to pay all claims, 
but cautioning that “powerful arguments for preventing repeated awards of punitive damages for the 
same act or series of acts . . . might provide a threshold justification for the exercise of discretion in 
certifying a nationwide (mandatory) Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class for punitive damages”). 
 29. Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 306. 
 30. E.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 3, 693 F.2d at 852 (“Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification is proper 
only when separate punitive damage claims necessarily will affect later claims.”). 
 31. E.g., In re “Agent Orange”, 100 F.R.D. at 726 (“[T]he proper standard is whether there is a 
substantial probability—that is less than a preponderance but more than a mere possibility—that if 
damages are awarded, the claims of earlier litigants would exhaust the defendants’ assets.”). 
 32. Bendectin, 749 F.2d at 306. 
 33. Id. 
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the proper standard for finding a limited fund has now been superseded 
by the standards set forth in Ortiz, which set the bar for certification of a 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class.34 
A second and somewhat anomalous rationale for rejecting 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class was that such a 
mandatory class action order impermissibly violated the federal Anti-
Injunction Act by restraining state court claimants from settling their 
claims.35  The Eighth Circuit announced this theory in the Federal 
Skywalk cases, where the Court suggested that a district court’s order 
certifying a punitive damage class operated as an injunction against 
pending state proceedings, and therefore violated federal law prohibiting 
federal injunctions of pending parallel state-court proceedings.36  
Although the Anti-Injunction Act rationale for rejecting 23(b)(1)(B) 
certification was invoked but not applied in the School Asbestos 
Litigation,37 the rationale largely failed to gain traction in federal 
jurisprudence.38 
A third reason courts denied class certification to a proposed 
nationwide Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class arises from 
differences in applicable law.  Thus, early on, the Ninth Circuit in the 
Dalkon Shield litigation rejected a district court’s certification of a 
nationwide punitive damage class where the court concluded that “the 50 
jurisdictions in which these cases arise do not apply the same punitive 
                                                     
 34. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 838–40 (1999). 
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006) (codifying the Anti-Injunction Act). 
 36. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).  See Hines, supra note 14, at 
906–07 (discussing rejection of 23(b)(1)(B) class based on Anti-Injunction Act). 
 37. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).  The district court had conditionally 
certified a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), finding that there was a “substantial possibility 
that early awards of punitive damages in individual cases [would] impair or impede the ability of 
future claimants to obtain punitive damages.”  In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 437 (E.D. 
Pa. 1984).  The defendants appealed this portion of the district court’s class certification order on 
several grounds, including that the court’s order violated the Anti-Injunction Act.  The appellate 
court did not review the 23(b)(1)(B) order on the Anti-Injunction argument.  789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 
1986). 
 38. But see In re Exxon Valdez, 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision) 
(commenting on the Federal Skywalk Anti-Injunction challenge to mandatory class certification, 
concluding that the Anti-Injunction Act rationale did not apply to the court’s order, and ultimately 
dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction).  The Federal Skywalk decision was largely criticized in 
academic commentary.  See generally Richard P. Cusick, Procedural Impediments to the Resolution 
of Mass Tort Cases: The Anti-Injunction Act and the Due Process Clause, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 485 (1997); Robert C. Gordon, The Optimum Management of the Skywalks Mass Disaster 
Litigation by the Use of the Federal Mandatory Class Action Device, 52 UMKC L. REV. 215 (1984); 
Steven M. Larimore, Exploring the Interface Between Rule 23 Class Actions in the Anti-Injunction 
Act, 18 GA. L. REV. 259 (1984); Scott O. Wright & Joseph A. Colussi, The Successful Use of the 
Class Action Device in the Management of the Skywalks Mass Tort Litigation, 52 UMKC L. REV. 
141 (1984). 
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damages standards.  Punitive damage standards can range from gross 
negligence to reckless disregard to various levels of willfulness and 
wantonness.”39  In the Simon II litigation, Judge Weinstein attempted to 
solve the choice-of-law problem by determining that a single state’s law 
could apply to all punitive damage claims,40 or alternatively by 
subclassing.41  On appeal, the Second Circuit invalidated Judge 
Weinstein’s certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class, 
but did not reach the question of whether the court could legitimately 
apply one state’s law to a punitive damage class.42  However, federal 
courts have rejected attempts to resolve the punitive damage choice-of-
law problem through the subclassing mechanism.43  Consequently, 
applicable law problems for proposed multistate punitive damage classes 
still remain, and present a significant obstacle to class certification of 
punitive damage classes under any Rule 23 provision. 
A fourth reason courts have denied class certification of a proposed 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class has been grounded in the 
determination that a proposed class is underinclusive.  The paradigmatic 
case illustrating the under inclusive principle is the School Asbestos 
litigation.44  In that action, the plaintiffs―school districts throughout the 
United States that had abated asbestos materials from school 
buildings―sought certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage 
class.45  The district court granted certification, but the Third Circuit 
reversed, concluding that the effect of the mandatory class was to single 
out school districts “for special and possibly disadvantageous 
treatment.”46  The Third Circuit noted that there were thousands of other 
potential asbestos claimants not embraced by the class definition, who 
had the ability to seek exemplary damages from the defendants.  These 
claimants could seek damages without being subject to the strictures of a 
mandatory class, and therefore the quest for damages could devolve into 
                                                     
 39. Dalkon Shield, supra note 3, 693 F.2d at 850. 
 40. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 166–79 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) vacated 407 F.3d 125 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 41. Id. at 178–79. 
 42. In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 140 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Hines, supra note 14, at 
916–20. 
 43. See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 294 (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
(finding that “proposed punitive damages subclasses fail to satisfy Rule 23(b)”); see also Hines, 
supra note 14, at 917–18 (“Citing these state law variations, a number of courts have rejected class 
treatment of punitive damages liability.”). 
 44. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 45. Id. at 998–99. 
 46. Id. at 1006. 
0.6.0_MULLENIX FINAL 5/10/2010  12:38:28 PM 
2010] NINE LIVES: THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLASS 855 
a race to the courthouse among competing claimants.47  Similar to the 
Anti-Injunction rationale disallowing punitive damage classes, the 
underinclusiveness principle also failed to gain considerable traction as a 
theory for deflecting proposed punitive damage classes. 
Finally, a fifth reason for repudiation of a proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
damage class is based on the theory that a defendant may not utilize this 
class device to circumvent bankruptcy procedures, or to involuntarily 
modify one creditor’s rights against another.48  The paradigmatic case is 
the In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation (In re 
Keene Corp.), where the Second Circuit reversed Judge Weinstein’s 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory limited-fund class.49 
Although the Keene class certification did not involve a request for a 
punitive damage class, the appellate decision is nonetheless instructive 
concerning judicial limitations on the limited-fund class action.  In an 
unusual scenario, the Keene Corporation preemptively sought to resolve 
all its asbestos liabilities by securing certification of a mandatory 
settlement class.50  In order to provide an evidentiary basis for the 
existence of the limited fund, Judge Weinstein appointed a special master 
to make findings of the limited fund, which the master did.51  On appeal, 
the Second Circuit rejected this attempt to resolve the corporation’s 
liabilities through preemptive certification of a mandatory, limited-fund 
class action.  Referencing the Bankruptcy Act, the Court rejected the 
Keene Corporation’s arguments on behalf of the 23(b)(1)(B) class action 
“because [the arguments were] a self-evident evasion of the exclusive 
legal system established by Congress for debtors to seek relief.”52 
B. Successful Punitive Damage Classes 
Notwithstanding the cluster of reported decisions rejecting proposed 
punitive damage class actions, courts historically have approved punitive 
                                                     
 47. Id. 
 48. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 982 F.2d 721 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (disallowing use of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action to circumvent bankruptcy laws).  But 
cf. Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (certification of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action 
where likelihood of aggregation of all claims against the defendant would render the defendant 
insolvent). 
 49. 14 F.3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993).  But cf. In re Joint E. & S. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 982 F.2d at 741 (upholding Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund class certification); In re 
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus.), 134 F.R.D. 32, 34 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(same). 
 50. Keene, 14 F.3d at 732. 
 51. Id. at 729. 
 52. Id. at 732. 
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damage classes in an equally small universe of cases.  These cases fall 
into two categories: (1) punitive damage class actions certified pursuant 
to Rule 23(b)(3), and (2) punitive damage classes approved pursuant to 
23(b)(1)(B).53  Typical of both sides of this debate, proponents of the 
punitive damage class tend to overstate the quantum of these decisions, 
as well as their precedential value and significance.54  As I suggest 
below, when all is said, done, and thoroughly analyzed, proponents of 
the punitive damage class basically have two viable precedents upon 
which to hang their hats: Hilao v. Estate of Marcos55 and In re Exxon 
Valdez.56  In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Dukes v. 
Wal-mart, Inc. establishes a possible precedent for a Rule 23(b)(2) 
punitive damage class, although this decision currently is on appeal for 
rehearing en banc.57 
1. Rule 23(b)(3) Punitive Damage Classes Approved 
Proponents of the punitive damage class cite to a litany of decisions 
familiar to mass-tort litigation attorneys: Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 
Inc.,58 Watson v. Shell Oil Co.,59 and Hilao v. Estate of Marcos.60  These 
                                                     
 53. Certification of punitive damage class actions under the Rule 23(b)(2) provision are 
extremely rare.  But see Dukes v. Wal-mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1188–89 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class for injunctive and declaratory relief, back pay, and punitive 
damages), reh’g en banc granted, 556 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2009).  The Dukes decision is discussed 
infra at Part II.B.3.  The Rule 23(b)(2) category for class certification embraces injunctive and 
declaratory relief.  Historically, the Rule 23(b)(2) class action has not embraced actions for 
compensatory damages.  The federal circuits currently apply different standards to determine 
whether class members may recover damages in a 23(b)(2) class action.  See, e.g., Molksi v. Gleich, 
318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying ad hoc subjective intent test); Robinson v. Metro-N 
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 
F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying bright-line test; requiring that injunctive or declaratory relief 
predominates to certify 23(b)(2) action and damages permitted only when “incidental” to the 
predominant injunctive relief); see also Underwood, supra note 1, at 786.  Compare Nelson v. Wal-
mart Stores, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 358, 380 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (refusing to certify punitive damage class 
under either Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3)), with Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co., 217 F.R.D. 430, 438–41 
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (certifying class in discrimination suit involving both equitable relief and punitive 
damages). 
 54. See, e.g., Underwood, supra note 1, at 798 (“Opponents of the punitive damage class action 
are too quick to disregard the many examples of such certified classes and to strain to read between 
the lines in finding some message of abandonment of the device.”). 
 55. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 56. 26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 57. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 58. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming trial court certification of Rule 23(b)(3) class action 
trial plan and bifurcated trial of compensatory and punitive damages). 
 59. 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), aff’g Adams v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Shell Oil Co.), 136 
F.R.D. 588, 590 (E.D. La. 1991) (certifying 23(b)(3) class). 
 60. 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving Rule 23(b)(3) class certification with bifurcated 
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cases all predate Ortiz.  Jenkins, Watson, and Hilao each involved class 
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).  Obviously, if the Jenkins line of 
authority were asserted today in support of certification of a punitive 
damage class, such Rule 23(b)(3) classes would not be subject to Ortiz’s 
limited-fund requirements. 
Notwithstanding Ortiz and subsequent judicial developments, 
proponents of the punitive damage class continue to cite to the Jenkins 
line of authority as support for the proposition that punitive damage 
classes have been approved in the past and are equally tenable today.61  
However, properly construed, the Jenkins–Watson–Hilao line of 
authority provides problematic support for the punitive damage class, 
especially after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cimino v. Raymark 
Industries, Inc. where the court reexamined its prior enthusiasm for 
exotic trial plans, statistical extrapolation of damages, and punitive 
damage classes.62  In addition, other commentators63 have suggested that 
the reverse-bifurcated trial plans approved in these cases cannot 
withstand scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s decisions in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell64 and Phillip Morris USA 
v. Williams.65 
Moreover, it is perhaps worth noting that in none of these cases did a 
court actually certify a punitive damage class.66  Instead, the courts 
certified conventional Rule 23(b)(3) compensatory damage classes, 
which included a multiphase, reverse-bifurcated trial structure for 
                                                                                                                       
trial plan with classwide trial of punitive damages). 
 61. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 797–807. 
 62. 151 F.3d 297, 335 (5th Cir. 1998) (disapproving certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) asbestos 
class based on a multi-phase trial using statistical extrapolation to determine damages, with phase I 
based on the Jenkins model). 
 63. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: 
The Prejudicial Practice of a “Reverse Bifurcation” Approach to Punitive Damages, 2 
CHARLESTON L. REV. 375, 397, 400 (2008) (arguing that determining punitive damages before 
compensatory damages raises serious constitutional issues and violates procedural due process 
“because it leaves the jury to determine a punitive damages ratio without a nexus to the defendants’ 
conduct toward any particular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs”); Byron G. Stier, Now It’s Personal: 
Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 433, 
445–46 (2008) (“By stating that due process requires punitive damages to be based on the harm to 
particular plaintiffs whose evidence is before the jury, Philip Morris suggests that these punitive-first 
class trial plans will offend due process―neither the multiplier nor lump-sum approach allows the 
defendant to offer every available defense, nor provides sufficient information on the extent of harm 
to those other than the class representatives, such that the punitive award can be said to bear a 
‘reasonable relationship’ to compensatory damages.”). 
 64. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 65. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 66. This is unlike cases in which the parties seek certification of a punitive damage class 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) on the limited fund theory. 
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determining classwide punitive damages based on a multiplier.67  Finally, 
it is also perhaps worth noting that no classwide determination or award 
of punitive damages was actually ever made either in Jenkins or Watson. 
In Jenkins, the Fifth Circuit upheld certification of a 23(b)(3) class of 
asbestos claimants, based on a novel three-phase trial plan.68  In the first 
phase, the jury was to make a classwide determination of common 
liability and defense issues—most notably the applicability of the “state-
of-the-art” defense.69  In addition, the jury was to determine a punitive 
damage multiplier.70  In the second phase, the claims of individual class 
representatives would be tried.71  Finally, in a third phase, the individual 
issues of class members would be resolved in subsequent mini-trials of 
four to ten plaintiffs.72  This model trial plan conventionally has been 
denominated as a “reverse-bifurcated” trial plan because a jury 
effectively is called upon to determine dispositive defenses and liability 
for punitive damages, before a jury determination of actual, 
compensatory damages. 
Building on this model, the Fifth Circuit again approved the 
technique of a classwide punitive damage multiplier (before trial of 
compensatory damages) in Watson,73 and the Ninth Circuit relied on 
Jenkins in approving a multiphase trial plan, including classwide punitive 
damages, in Hilao.74 
Whether the Jenkins–Watson–Hilao trilogy provides robust doctrinal 
support for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage class today 
                                                     
 67. Elizabeth Cabraser and Robert Nelson make the interesting argument that Jenkins, although 
decided more than twenty years ago, may have continuing viability after Ortiz and Phillip Morris 
“because of its prescient approach to the punitive damages ‘ratio’ issue.”  Cabraser & Nelson, supra 
note 4, at 422. 
 68. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 69. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 281–82 (E.D. Tex. 1985). 
 70. Id. at 282. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992).  In Watson, the district court 
approved a Rule 23(b)(3) trial plan consisting of four phases.  Id. at 1017–18.  Phase I would resolve 
common issues of liability and punitive damages.  Id. at 1018.  In Phase II, a jury would determine 
liability for compensatory damages in twenty fully-tried individual class representatives’ cases.  Id.  
In Phase III, a different jury would resolve issues of compensatory damages, such as causation and 
quantum.  Id.  Phase IV provided for the district court’s computing of punitive damages.  Id.  The 
Fifth Circuit approved the trial plan as to punitive damages.  Id. at 1018–21. 
Relying on both Jenkins and Watson, the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
certified a punitive damage class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).  Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 
F.R.D. 544, 560 (E.D. La. 1995).  This class certification was reversed by the Fifth Circuit.  84 F.3d 
734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 74. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d at 767, 782 (9th Cir. 1996).  The Hilao trial plan called 
for a three-phase trial modeled on Jenkins.  Id. 
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seems questionable, especially in light of subsequent judicial 
developments.  Of significance, and as plaintiffs’ attorneys conceded, 
after the initial appellate victory “the Jenkins litigation went downhill.”75  
After a number of days at trial, the Jenkins class action was settled and 
the court never actually implemented the novel trial plan approved by 
both the district and appellate court.76  The Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Jenkins was further undermined in both In re Fibreboard Corp.77 and 
Cimino.78 
Similarly, Watson is problematic for advocates who wish to rely on 
this decision as an endorsement of the punitive damage class because not 
only did litigants in Watson settle, but the Watson decision technically 
was vacated on appeal.79  After the Fifth Circuit initially endorsed the 
Watson class certification and trial plan, the defendants petitioned and 
were granted rehearing en banc.80  Faced with the prospect of appellate 
review by the entire Fifth Circuit, the parties settled.81  As a consequence 
of the settlement, the Watson judgment was vacated and the full panel of 
the Fifth Circuit never opined on the propriety of the Watson trial plan.82  
Consequently, the Watson decision has remained a source of contested 
authority concerning its precedential value.83 
There are further reasons to question the precedential value of 
Jenkins and Watson as authority for endorsement of the Rule 23(b)(3) 
punitive damage class.  Both the Jenkins and Watson classes were 
relatively small and geographically circumscribed classes.  The Jenkins 
                                                     
 75. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 423.  Cabraser and Nelson suggest that after the 
Jenkins certification order was affirmed, “the trial court struggled to maintain a class-wide structure 
through successive phases of injury, specific causation, and damages determinations.”  Id. 
 76. See In re Raymark Indus., Inc., 831 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district 
courts’ approval of the settlement). 
 77. 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that a class of a trifurcated trial plan could not be 
certified). 
 78. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (reversing judgment of phase 
III of a trifurcated plan). 
 79. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 558 n.15 (E.D. La. 1995) (“The Court 
understands that the Watson judgment was vacated by the grant of rehearing en banc and that the 
case settled thereafter without the Fifth Circuit having an opportunity to opine on the propriety of the 
panel decision. . . . Nevertheless, the Court finds Watson persuasive in light of the prior Fifth Circuit 
discussion in Jenkins.”). 
 80. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g en banc granted, 990 F.2d 
805 (5th Cir. 1993), appeal dismissed, 53 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 81. Castano, 160 F.R.D. at 558 n.15. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Notwithstanding this procedural history, Watson continues to be cited by proponents of the 
punitive damage class in support of judicial approval of this mechanism.  For criticisms of the Fifth 
Circuit’s original panel decision in Watson, see Hines, supra note 14, at 939–41. 
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class was limited to asbestos claimants in the Eastern District of Texas,84 
and the Watson class was limited to claimants exposed to injuries 
resulting from an oil refinery explosion in Louisiana.85  Consequently, 
neither court in Jenkins or Watson was confronted with sprawling 
multistate or nationwide classes that would have required the courts to 
consider applicable-law issues, and whether such applicable-law 
complications would have undermined the predominance and superiority 
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).  The Watson litigation involved a 
localized mass-accident case, with claims brought solely under Louisiana 
law.86  Because of the localized nature of the underlying events, the 
Louisiana court was able to justify the Jenkins-style trial plan with a 
punitive damage phase, determining that the defendant’s single course of 
conduct—causing injury to all the plaintiffs—was identical for each class 
member.87 
Hilao, then, remains the sole example of a 23(b)(3) class action for 
compensatory and punitive damages that was certified, actually tried, and 
resulted in quantifiable damages to the class claimants.88  In Hilao and its 
preceding litigation the Ninth Circuit upheld a Jenkins-style trifurcated 
trial plan that permitted punitive damages to be assessed prior to the 
determination of actual compensatory damages.89 
The Hilao decision, however, also presents a challenging precedent 
for advocates of the punitive damage class.90  The Ninth Circuit’s various 
holdings approving this Rule 23(b)(3) compensatory and punitive 
damage class may be cabined by various distinguishing facts.  Unlike 
most federal diversity-based mass-tort cases, the Hilao litigation was 
pursued under the federal Alien Torts Claim Act,91 and involved alleged 
egregious violations of human rights, including murder, torture, 
genocide, and disappearance.92  As such, the Hilao litigation was 
freighted with sympathetic political implications compelling some forum 
for palliative justice.93  The class members as well as the defendant were 
                                                     
 84. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 85. Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1016–17 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 86. Id. at 1017. 
 87. Id. at 1019. 
 88. Class members were awarded $750 million in compensatory damages and $1.2 billion in 
exemplary damages.  See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 89. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 767; In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation 25 
F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 90. For doctrinal criticism of the Ninth Circuit’s approval of Hilao, see Hines, supra note 14, at 
941–42. 
 91. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1468–69. 
 92. Id. at 1472. 
 93. See generally id. (“Marcos’s acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were clearly acts 
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all foreign nationals.94  The defendant was the estate of a deposed 
despot.95  Moreover, the court essentially glossed over choice-of-law 
issues embedded in the class action96 in an effort to construct an 
administrative model for compensating egregious human-rights 
violations.97  The Ninth Circuit endorsed the concept of a reverse-
trifurcated trial plan, which may not withstand scrutiny today.  Finally, 
the Ninth Circuit chose to ignore and deflect the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
in Cimino that disapproved the statistical extrapolation of compensatory 
damages in a multiphase trial, aligning instead with Jenkins and Watson 
in approving the Hilao trial plan.98 
Leading proponents of the viability of the punitive damage class 
today have accurately noted that “Jenkins’[s] original concept of the 
Phase I, class-wide punitive damage determination, and the calculation 
of a uniform ratio based upon the class-wide jury’s assessment of the 
defendants’ conduct, was never reversed.”99  As such, these advocates 
impliedly suggest that Jenkins, Watson, and Hilao remain compelling 
authority for certifying Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage classes based on 
reverse-bifurcated trial plans.  However, the novel trial plans endorsed in 
Jenkins, Watson, and Hilao were never reviewed by the Supreme Court.  
And, post-Jenkins, proposed punitive damage class actions have 
foundered on conventional Rule 23(b)(3) grounds, such as lack of 
predominance, superiority, and manageability.100 
Moreover, the three appellate decisions in Jenkins, Watson, and 
Hilao were rendered before the Supreme Court’s rulings in State Farm v. 
                                                                                                                       
outside his authority as President.”). 
 94. Id. at 1467–70. 
 95. Id. at 1469. 
 96. See id. at 1472–73.  The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s determination to apply a 
combination of federal common law and Philippine law to the claims.  Id. at 1473. 
 97. See id. at 1471–73. 
 98. See generally Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming trial plan); 
In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1461, 1463–68 (D. Haw. 1995) 
(describing trifurcated trial plan and statistical extrapolation for compensatory damages); see also 
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319–21 (5th Cir. 1998); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 
Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 99. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 423. 
 100. See e.g., Williams v. Telespectrum, Inc., No. 3:05cv853, 2007 WL 6787411, at *19–23 
(E.D. Va. June 1, 2007) (denying Rule 23(b)(3) class certification partly because of due process 
concerns with class-wide punitive damage adjudication); O’Neal v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., No. 3: 
03-cv-397, 2006 WL 1469348, at *68–69 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2006) (denying class certification 
because court would have to engage in numerous individualized mini-trials to determine whether 
each class member should receive punitive damages); Carlson v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 
No. 02-3780, 2005 WL 758602, at *49–50 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2005) (denying class certification 
because individualized fact determinations required to calculate punitive damages would undermine 
manageability). 
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Campbell and Philip Morris v. Williams.  Arguably, the Court’s evolving 
punitive damage jurisprudence announced in these cases has placed 
constitutional due process constraints on a collision course with Jenkins-
style trial plans, so central to certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) punitive 
damage class.  Hence, the continued vitality of the 23(b)(3) punitive 
damage class, based on reverse-bifurcated trial plans, is inexorably 
linked with the Court’s evolving punitive damage jurisprudence. 
2. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) Punitive Damage Classes Approved 
Similar to the Jenkins line of authority, proponents of the punitive 
damage class routinely cite a litany of cases to demonstrate that federal 
courts historically have certified punitive damage class actions under the 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provisions.101  Chief among this small universe of cases 
are district-court class certifications in the Dalkon Shield,102 School 
Asbestos,103 and Agent Orange104 litigations.  However, even as 
proponents sometimes grudgingly note, the Dalkon Shield and Asbestos 
School certifications did not survive appellate review.105  This historical 
account is further muddied because the much-cited Agent Orange Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) certification is itself of questionable pedigree as a precedent 
for the 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class.106  And, as commentators 
note, these historical examples of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) all predate the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz, as well as the Court’s evolving 
                                                     
 101. See e.g., Nagy, supra note 14, at 610 (“Prior to State Farm, only a handful of mandatory 
punitive damage classes had been certified under 23(b)(1)(B).”). 
 102. In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 
1981). 
 103. In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 422, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
 104. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F.  Supp. 690, 705–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 105. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1004–05 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class certification); Dalkon Shield, supra note 3, 693 F.2d at 852 (same). 
 106. In the usual rendering of the Agent Orange litigation, proponents of the punitive damage 
class point to vindication by the Second Circuit of the (b)(1)(B) punitive damage class in In re 
Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).  See, e.g., Nagy, supra note 14, 
at 610 n.89.  However, the actual history of the Agent Orange punitive damage class certification is 
much more complicated and nuanced.  As Professor Hines has noted, the Second Circuit in Diamond 
Shamrock refused to issue a writ of mandamus decertifying the punitive damage class, but this does 
not amount to appellate approval of the certification.  See Hines, supra note 14, at 905 n.83.  
Ultimately, the parties in Agent Orange settled the litigation pursuant to a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out 
class, which settlement excluded punitive damages.  On direct appeal to the Second Circuit of 
various aspects of the settlement, the Second Circuit concluded that it “need not address the 
propriety of the certification of a mandatory class under Rules 23(b)(1)(B).”  In re “Agent Orange” 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 167 (2d Cir. 1987).  But cf.  In re Joint E. & S. Dists.  Asbestos 
Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 736–37 (2d Cir. 1992) (repudiating class certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
class in bankruptcy, but construing Diamond Shamrock to imply approval of (b)(1)(B) certification 
on a limited punishment theory). 
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jurisprudence articulating the constitutional parameters for punitive 
damage awards.107  Consequently, any remaining authority of these 
historical, pre-Ortiz Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class certification 
decisions seems entirely strained.108 
Instead, the Exxon Valdez litigation provides the most viable 
contemporary illustration of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class.109  
Remarkably, the Exxon Valdez litigation spans nearly two decades.  The 
events underlying this litigation occurred in 1989, when the Exxon 
Valdez ran aground in the Prince William Sound in Alaska, resulting in 
an oil spill affecting thousands of Alaskans.  The federal district court 
certified a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class in 1994.110  In 2008, nearly twenty 
years after the oil spill, the Supreme Court issued its opinion, in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, upholding the availability of punitive damages 
pursuant to federal maritime law, but severely limiting the quantum of 
those damages to a one-to-one ratio of compensatory to punitive 
damages.111 
As is well-known, the procedural history of the Exxon Valdez 
litigation is notable because the litigants and the federal district court 
                                                     
 107. See, e.g., Hines, supra note 14, at 906 n.84 (“Of course, these cases all pre-date the 
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence articulating substantive due process limits on the imposition 
of punitive damages, which might provide more compelling grounds to proceed with a limited 
punishment class.”). 
 108. For a balanced assessment of these precedents, see Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 422 
& n.41 (“Historically, while their rationale appears compelling, punitive damage class actions have 
achieved mixed results.  Class actions focusing on punitive damage claims have most frequently 
sought certification under Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(b)(1)(B), commonly known as the ‘limited fund’ class 
provision.  The proof of a limited fund has always been exacting, and became more so in 1999 with 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v.  Fibreboard.”). 
Another pre-Ortiz attempt to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class similarly provides 
weak support for the viability of the punitive damage class pursuant to that provision.  See In re 
Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 1995).  In the breast 
implant litigation, the plaintiffs sought certification and approval of a conventional Rule 23(b)(3) 
opt-out compensatory global damage class settlement, in the amount of $4 billion.  In turn, the 
defendant, Dow Corning, sought certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class, to 
insulate itself from potential repetitive punitive damages awards to claimants who opted out of the 
Rule 23(b)(3) class.  The plaintiffs objected to the defendant’s proposal for the mandatory class, and 
the federal district court denied Dow Corning’s request.  As a consequence, Dow subsequently 
withdrew from the proposed settlement and filed for bankruptcy.  For a narrative of these events, see 
Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 424–25. 
 109. In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).  The Simon II tobacco litigation in the 
Eastern District of New York provides the other post-Ortiz attempt to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
punitive damage class, which the Second Circuit repudiated.  In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 
(E.D. N.Y. 2002), vacated 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Simon II decision is discussed infra at 
notes 176–97 and accompanying text. 
 110. Decision Regarding Certification of a Mandatory Punitive Damages Class, In re Exxon 
Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066 (D. Alaska Mar. 8, 1994), (Order No. 180, No. A89-0095-CV) [hereinafter 
Certification Decision, Exxon Valdez]. 
 111. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
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found themselves whip-sawed by the Supreme Court’s developing 
punitive damage jurisprudence.112  After certification of a Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class, the Exxon case was tried to a jury in 1994 in a 
multiphase trial that determined liability for compensatory damages first, 
followed by a classwide determination of punitive damages.113  The jury 
returned a classwide verdict of punitive damages in the amount of $5 
billion.  However, the jury returned its original punitive damage award 
prior to the Supreme Court’s punitive damage decisions in BMW v. 
Gore,114 Cooper v. Leatherman,115 and State Farm v. Campbell.116 
Consequently, Exxon appealed the $5 billion punitive damage award 
twice to the Ninth Circuit, and in both instances the appellate court 
remanded to the district court for recalculation of the punitive damage 
award in light of the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence.117 
The Exxon Valdez litigation saga, then, has always focused on issues 
relating to the availability of punitive damages and application of 
appropriate standards for determining a constitutionally sustainable 
quantum of damages.118  During the Exxon Valdez’s lengthy odyssey 
through the judicial system, at no time was the class certification 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B) challenged, contested, or subject to 
appellate scrutiny.  Consequently, the district court’s approval of the 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class remains a signal illustration of a 
successful punitive damage class certification. 
The Exxon Valdez punitive damage class certification is significant 
for several reasons.  The defendant, rather than the plaintiffs, sought 
certification of the mandatory punitive damage class.119  Exxon requested 
this certification based on the “limited punishment” theory of punitive 
damages.120  The district court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that due 
process could be satisfied by informing juries in any individual case of 
previous punitive damage awards, but was instead concerned that the 
                                                     
 112. See Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 423–24; Hines, supra note 14, at 907–09. 
 113. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079–80 (D. Alaska 2004). 
 114. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 115. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 116. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 117. See In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (reducing the punitive 
damage award to $2.5 billion); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001); see also In 
re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004) (applying State Farm and BMW guidelines 
retroactively; finding 1994 jury instructions comported with State Farm requirements imposed in 
2003; recalculating punitive damage award to $4.5 billion). 
 118. See Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 423–24. 
 119. Certification Decision, Exxon Valdez, supra note 110, at 8. 
 120. Hines, supra note 14, at 908 (citing Certification Decision, Exxon Valdez, supra note 110, 
at 8.) 
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defendant could be excessively punished by being subjected to multiple, 
repetitive punitive damage awards.121  The district court thus agreed with 
Exxon and granted certification based on a limited fund and limited 
punishment rationale, partially relying on the Court’s then-prevailing 
punitive damage decisions in TXO v. Alliance122 and Pacific Mutual Life 
v. Haslip.123  The district court construed TXO and Haslip as placing 
substantive due process limits on punitive damages by placing 
reasonable limits on punishment.124 
Moreover, the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class certification 
in the Exxon Valdez litigation is factually distinctive because the federal 
court enjoyed a “high degree of deference and cooperation” with the 
Alaskan state courts in resolving the Exxon Valdez claims,125 and 
therefore never issued an injunction restraining parallel state court 
litigation.126  Such an injunction might have vitiated the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
class certification pursuant to the Federal Skywalk Anti-Injunction 
principle. 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit’s approval of the Rule 23(b)(3) class in 
Hilao, the Exxon Valdez class certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive 
damage class provides a problematic precedent for the punitive damage 
class.  First, it is highly unusual for a defendant to seek certification of a 
                                                     
 121. Certification Decision, Exxon Valdez, supra note 110, at 10 n.9.  The district court was 
concerned that unfairness would result as a consequence of individual punitive damage trials, which 
opened the possibility that early successful litigants could reap a windfall at the expense of later-
filing claimants.  See Hines, supra note 14, at 908. 
 122. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
 123. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); see also Hines, supra note 14, 
at 908 (describing the district court’s reliance on Haslip and the court’s recent punitive damage 
jurisprudence). 
 124. The district court, in certifying the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, noted that “recent developments 
in the law have, in substance, created a limited fund for punitive damages in multi-claim cases,” and 
that these are “substantive limits beyond which penalties may not go,” without violating the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Certification Decision, Exxon Valdez, supra note 
110, at 8.  The court further opined: 
From the case law it is apparent that the defendant’s assets are not the only consideration 
which may limit a punitive damage award.  Substantive due process also limits punitive 
damages by placing reasonable limits on punishment.  A defendant with tremendous 
assets, such as Exxon, does not face unlimited punitive damages.  Rather due process 
places a limit on punitive damages, and, in substance, creates a limited fund from which 
punitive damages may be awarded. 
Id. at 9. 
 125. See id. at 11.  As indicated earlier, the Ninth Circuit rebuffed a challenge to the Exxon 
Valdez certification based on the Federal Skywalk Anti-Injunction theory.  See In re Exxon Valdez, 
26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). 
 126. The Alaskan courts apparently extended just such deference and comity to the federal 
proceedings, and rejected punitive damage claims in parallel state court actions.  See In re Exxon 
Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Chenega Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 769, 775 
(Alaska 1999). 
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mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class,127 but the Exxon 
Valdez litigation illustrates why future defendants in egregious cases 
might want to pursue this course. 
One can only surmise that, faced with a really bad set of underlying 
facts128 and thousands of really, really angry Alaskans, the Exxon 
Corporation made the strategic decision to cabin its own liability through 
a classwide trial of compensatory and punitive damages.  The mandatory 
punitive class essentially permitted Exxon to mitigate its punishment in 
one substantial lash, rather than dying painfully from a thousand 
repetitive lashes.129  In this regard, the mandatory punitive damage class 
resembled the civil equivalent of criminal plea bargaining—it enabled 
Exxon to bid down its own punishment.130 
Other characteristics of the Exxon Valdez litigation qualify the 
general applicability of this successful Rule 23(b)(1)(B) certification.  
Exxon Valdez concerned a classical environmental mass-accident case 
that was geographically limited, and subject to one body of federal 
maritime common law.131  Consequently, the Exxon Valdez provides an 
uncertain precedent for sprawling, nationwide products-liability mass-
tort cases.132  As indicated above, because the federal and state courts 
amicably permitted the litigant to proceed in federal court, the certified 
class was not vulnerable to an Anti-Injunction Act challenge.  Moreover, 
in the Exxon Valdez trial, the jury first rendered a compensatory damage 
verdict in favor of the class before proceeding to determine punitive 
damages for the same class.133  As such, the Exxon Valdez class 
                                                     
 127. But see In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala. 
1995) (Defendant Dow Corning sought certification of a mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive 
damage class and was rebuffed by the district court). 
 128. Chief among those facts were an admittedly drunken sea captain and a huge amount of dead 
fish and birds.  See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON 
VALDEZ, 5–14 (1990), http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/facts/details.cfm. 
 129. See Fisher, supra note 14, at 6 (analogizing between civil and criminal punishment and 
arguing that courts should accede to legislative determinations to impose substantial punitive 
damage awards, in the same way courts regularly accede to legislative determinations to impose 
exceptionally severe criminal punishment). 
 130. And although Exxon could not have predicted this in 1994, the glacial pace of appellate 
review redounded to Exxon’s benefit through successively restrictive punitive damage decisions 
from the Supreme Court.  By the time the snow settled in 2008, Exxon had managed to reduce its 
liability for punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio.  See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 
2611 (2008). 
 131. See Hines, supra note 14, at 908.  Notably, because the litigation was pursued under 
principles of federal maritime law, applying a body of federal common law, the Exxon Valdez 
precedent may have even more limited applicability to diversity-based mass torts, or other federal 
question cases. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 428. 
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certification was not vulnerable to challenges based on reverse-bifurcated 
trial plans such as those in Jenkins, Watson, and Hilao. 
Perhaps most important, the Exxon Valdez punitive damage class 
certification predated Ortiz and the Second Circuit’s decision in Simon 
II, discussed below.  The Exxon Valdez certification relied heavily on a 
“limited punishment” theory of punitive damages, a theory which has not 
been validated by other federal courts.134  The Supreme Court in Ortiz 
did not address or endorse a limited-punishment theory for certification 
of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class.135  In Simon II, the district court also did not 
rely on a limited-punishment theory for certification of a Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class.136  Instead, the court invoked a “limited generosity” 
theory, which focuses on a defendant’s assets available to pay out all 
claims, based on the existence of a limited fund.137  In Simon II, the 
district court concluded that the constitutional limits placed on the total 
punitive damages created a limited fund.138  On appeal, the Second 
Circuit hewed closely to the Ortiz requirements in repudiating the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) class certification, giving “short shrift” to the limited-
punishment theory as an independent basis for class treatment of punitive 
damages.139 
In summary, then, proponents of the punitive damage class invoke 
two separate lines of authority: the Rule 23(b)(3) class illustrated by 
Hilao, and the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class illustrated by Exxon Valdez.  For 
the reasons explored above, both precedents provide tenuous support for 
the punitive damage class. 
3. Rule 23(b)(2) Punitive Damage Class Approved 
Commentators on the current punitive damage class debate tend to 
overlook the Ninth Circuit’s 2007 decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,140 
upholding certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in a Title VII141 employment discrimination case, which 
included certification of the 23(b)(2) class for back pay and punitive 
damages.  Significantly, the class plaintiffs in Dukes did not seek 
                                                     
 134. See In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86, 184–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing limited 
punishment theory), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 135. Id. at 183–84. 
 136. Id. at 184–86. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 185. 
 139. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 426. 
 140. Dukes II, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’g Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 141. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
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compensatory damages other than back pay.  As suggested below, the 
Dukes punitive damage class may play a pivotal role in judicial thinking 
about the punitive damage class. 
In Dukes, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class and approved a two-phase trial plan.  In 
Phase I, the plaintiffs would attempt to prove that Wal-Mart engaged in a 
pattern and practice of discrimination through its company-wide 
employment practices.142  If the plaintiffs were successful in Phase I, 
they would also attempt to prove an entitlement to punitive damages.143  
Assuming the plaintiffs prevailed in Phase I, in Phase II the court would 
fashion classwide injunctive relief.144  In addition, a special master would 
calculate—based on an unspecified formula—a lump-sum back-pay 
award that Wal-Mart owed to the class.145  The court would not 
adjudicate the merits of any particular class members’ claim.146  In 
addition, the district court’s certification order granted notice to class 
members and permitted class plaintiffs to opt out of claims for punitive 
damages.147 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld certification of the 23(b)(2) 
class, including the punitive damage portion of the class certification.148  
Following Ninth Circuit precedent in Molski v. Gleich149 regarding Rule 
23(b)(2) class certification, the appellate court found that the district 
court had acted within its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs’ claims 
for punitive damages did not “predominate over their claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief.”150  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 
approved the district court’s order of notice and opt-out rights in the 
(b)(2) class, finding support in precedents suggesting that an opt-out 
right might be appropriate where plaintiffs move to certify a class for 
punitive damages.151 
                                                     
 142. See Dukes I, 222 F.R.D. at 173. 
 143. This inquiry would require proof that Wal-Mart’s pattern and practice of discrimination 
“was undertaken maliciously or recklessly in the face of perceived risk that the defendant’s actions 
would violate federal law.”  See id. 
 144. Id. at 174. 
 145. Id. at 176. 
 146. Id. at 187. 
 147. Id. at 173. 
 148. Dukes II, 509 F.3d 1168, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 149. 318 F.3d 937, 947–50 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 150. Dukes II, 509 F.3d at 1188 (citing Molski, 318 F.3d at 947–50; Robinson v. Metro-N. 
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (“recognizing that a district court may certify a 
class [action] under (b)(2) if it finds in its discretion that the positive weight or value of injunctive 
relief is predominant even though punitive damages are claimed”)). 
 151. See id. at 1188–89 (citing In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 (5th Cir. 
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The Ninth Circuit also upheld the proposed Dukes two-phase trial 
plan, concluding that the plan did not present manageability problems 
that would defeat class certification.152  The court’s primary precedent 
for upholding the Dukes trial plan was its prior approval of the Hilao trial 
plan.153  The Ninth Circuit concluded: 
Because we see no reason why a similar procedure to that used in Hilao 
could not be employed in this case, we conclude that there exists at 
least one method of managing this large class action that, albeit 
somewhat imperfect, nonetheless protects the due process rights of all 
involved parties.154 
The Dukes Rule 23(b)(2) punitive damage class represents perhaps 
the ultimate adventuresome expansion of the punitive damage class.  
First, the punitive damage class is un-tethered from Ortiz requirements 
because the action is not based on a limited fund, limited generosity, or 
limited punishment theory.  Second, the Dukes class is predicated on the 
premise that class members may recover punitive damages in a 23(b)(2) 
class action, if those punitive damages may be characterized as not 
motivating the litigation.  Third, the Dukes (b)(2) class certification 
authorizes the award of punitive damages unanchored to any prior 
finding of compensatory damages.  Fourth, the Dukes (b)(2) certification 
permits novel notice and opt-out rights in a (b)(2) class to claimants who 
do not wish to claim punitive damages.  And fifth, the nationwide Rule 
23(b)(2) class evades scrutiny under the more stringent 23(b)(3) 
predominance and superiority requirements, which otherwise typically 
undermine the certification of multistate damage class actions. 
4. A Further Note on the Ninth Circuit’s Hat Trick of Successful Rule 
23 Punitive Damage Class Certifications: Some Very Mixed 
Metaphors 
If I were a plaintiffs’ class action attorney seeking to certify a 
punitive damage class, I definitely would go to the Ninth Circuit.  As the 
law now stands, the Ninth Circuit has completed a trifecta of punitive 
                                                                                                                       
2004); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. 
Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994)). 
 152. Id. at 1190–91, 1193.  The Ninth Circuit also rejected or deflected challenges that the 
proposed trial plan violated the defendant Wal-Mart’s due process rights and the Rules Enabling 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  Id. 
 153. Id. at 1191–92. 
 154. Id. at 1192–93 (citations omitted). 
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damage classes, upholding such classes under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) (Exxon 
Valdez); Rule 23(b)(2) (Dukes v. Wal-Mart); and Rule 23(b)(3) (Hilao). 
Notably, however, neither the Hilao nor the Exxon Valdez punitive 
damage class certifications have been subjected to Supreme Court 
review.  The Ninth Circuit decision approving the class certification and 
trial plan in Hilao was never appealed to the Supreme Court.155  Hence, 
the Court has never reviewed the district court’s Rule 23(b)(3) class 
certification, the Hilao reverse-trifurcated trial plan, use of statistical 
sampling, or the use of a special master to administer claims and awards 
(among many other issues).  And although the Exxon Valdez punitive 
damage award did ultimately wend its way to the Supreme Court, the 
underlying class certification of the 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class 
did not. 
The Dukes Rule 23(b)(2) class certification currently is pending 
review by the Ninth Circuit en banc.156  The Dukes litigation involves 
highly motivated litigants on both sides of the docket.  Thus, if the Ninth 
Circuit en banc panel either upholds or reverses the class certification, it 
seems highly likely that the losing party in the class certification battle 
will seek Supreme Court review.157  Hence, the Dukes litigation now 
appears to be the most likely candidate to provide an appellate basis for 
Supreme Court pronouncements on the punitive damage class. 
In many respects—should it wind up on the Supreme Court docket—
the Dukes litigation presents an almost perfect storm of class action and 
punitive damage issues.  The Court would be called upon to resolve an 
array of unsettled and conflicting lower court decisions.  The Court 
would be called upon to resolve the Allison–Robinson–Jefferson–Molski 
conflict concerning the applicable standards for recovery of damages in 
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.158  The Court would be called upon the 
review novel trial plans derived from Jenkins, Watson, and Hilao.159  The 
Court would be called upon the resolve the unsettled Shutts issue: 
whether mandatory class actions may include notice and opt-out rights.160  
                                                     
 155. There is no record of a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court from the Ninth Circuit’s 
ultimate approval of the Hilao trial. 
 156. 556 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 157. The defendant Wal-Mart may be more highly motivated and strategically positioned to 
pursue a Supreme Court appeal from the liberal Ninth Circuit to an otherwise conservative Supreme 
Court.  Hence, an entirely rational plaintiff might determine not to bring an appeal from an order 
reversing class certification, to avoid setting a bad precedent for the plaintiffs’ bar in future class 
actions. 
 158. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 159. For discussion of these trial plans see supra notes 68–100 and accompanying text. 
 160. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).  See Hines, supra note 14, at 910 
(noting that in Shutts, the Court “permitted personal jurisdiction over out-of-state absent class 
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The Court would be called upon to assess the constitutional fairness of 
awarding punitive damages unmoored from compensatory damages. 
Unfortunately, what Dukes cannot illuminate are the parameters for 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory limited-fund punitive damage classes. 
III. ORTIZ, SIMON II, AND THE DEATH KNELL FOR THE PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE CLASS? 
This Article centers on revitalized arguments for the punitive damage 
class in the post-Ortiz era, which will be addressed in Part IV.  However, 
a brief summary of the judicial holdings in Ortiz and Simon II provides 
context for evaluating the renewed advocacy on behalf of the punitive 
damage class. 
In Ortiz, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a nationwide 
global settlement of asbestos claims that the Fifth Circuit had approved 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B).161  The Ortiz settlement class primarily 
encompassed compensatory damages, but the settlement also included 
punitive damage claims.  The Court noted—but did not resolve—the so-
called Shutts issue inherent in mandatory, non opt-out classes: whether a 
federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over absent class 
members with no ties to the forum, without violating constitutional due 
process.162 
Although the Court identified several grounds for repudiating the 
settlement,163 the Court’s core analysis focused on the requirements for 
establishing a legitimate Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund class.164  The 
Court’s analysis and conclusions in large part relied on a lengthy 
                                                                                                                       
members because of the opportunity afforded such plaintiffs to opt-out of the class”); see also Linda 
S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs’ Due Process: Implications for 
Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 913–16 (1995) (stating that in Shutts, notice 
requirements and opt-out provisions protect absent class members); Linda S. Mullenix, Getting to 
Shutts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 727, 727 (1998).  Ten years after Ortiz, the Supreme Court still has not 
resolved the so-called Shutts issue, that is, whether multistate, mandatory non-opt out classes violate 
due process in binding class members without contacts with the forum state.  See Adams v. 
Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 92 (1997) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); Ticor 
Title v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 126 (1994) (per curiam dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted). 
 161. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999).  See generally Hines, supra note 14, at 
909–21 (describing the Ortiz decision); Nagy, supra note 14, at 603–06 (same). 
 162. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 847–48.  See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 n.3. 
 163. Similar to its reasoning in Amchem, decided two years earlier, the Court held that the Ortiz 
class failed for a lack of adequacy of representation and typicality.  See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997); Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831–32. 
 164. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838–40. 
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historical exegesis of the limited-fund class action.165  Reviewing this 
history, the Court set forth three criteria for certification of a limited-fund 
class, requiring proof of: (1) the existence of an actual limited or 
insufficient fund, (2) use of the entire inadequate fund to pay all the 
claims in the class action, and (3) equitable treatment of all class 
claimants.166 
The Court concluded that the Ortiz settlement failed all three 
requirements.  First, there was no evidence of the existence of a truly 
limited fund because the settling parties had agreed to this by 
stipulation.167  In order to certify a limited-fund class action, a court must 
evaluate the number of claims against the fund as well as the defendant’s 
total assets.168  The Supreme Court held that parties must submit 
evidence that enables a court to “ascertain the limit and sufficiency of the 
fund, with support in findings of fact.”169  The Court also held that the 
Ortiz settlement failed the second requirement because, under the terms 
of the settlement, the defendant Fibreboard was able to continue its 
operations and retain almost all its net worth.170  Finally, the Court held 
that the Ortiz settlement failed the third requirement of equitable 
distribution among class members because of a lack of inclusiveness in 
the class, and fairness of distributions to those within the class.171 
The Ortiz decision, however, essentially did not address a Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class certification because punitive damage 
claims were not at the heart of the Ortiz settlement.  As the ensuing 
decade has demonstrated, the Ortiz Court’s demanding requirements for 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund have frustrated almost all 
attempts to certify a limited-fund class action.  Similar to the pre-Ortiz 
era, proponents of limited-fund class actions continue to have difficulties 
proving up the existence of a limited fund pursuant to post-Ortiz 
standards.  In addition, proponents of limited-fund class certification 
after Ortiz must satisfy two additional requirements.  Hence, judicial 
approval of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) settlement classes have been 
                                                     
 165. Id. at 833–37. 
 166. Id. at 838–40. 
 167. Id. at  848–49. 
 168. Id. at 850. 
 169. Id. at 849. 
 170. Id. at 859–60. 
 171. Id. at 854–55.  See also Hines, supra note 14, at 911–12 (discussing problems of Ortiz class 
under-inclusiveness and failure of the settlement proponents to provide structural assurances of due 
process fairness, as required by Amchem, such as subclassing or independent counsel); Nagy, supra 
note 14, at 606 (describing reasons for failure to satisfy the third equitable distribution requirement). 
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extraordinarily rare.172  Moreover, the prospect of certifying a stand-
alone punitive damage class after Ortiz (as in Dukes v. Wal-Mart) 
presents even more challenging due process obstacles.173 
The core Ortiz requirement for proof of a limited fund presents the 
chief reason for failure of post-Ortiz limited-fund class actions.  Hence, 
the Supreme Court’s articulation of a constitutional punitive damage 
jurisprudence breathed new life—theoretically—into the possibility of 
the limited-fund class action; the Court’s line of cases provided a new 
way of thinking about what constitutes a limited fund.  Hence, in the 
Simon II tobacco litigation, class counsel seized this opportunity and 
urged the novel theory that the constitutional cap on punitive damages, 
suggested by the Supreme Court, created the limited fund.174  Judge 
Weinstein agreed, and on this basis found a limited fund and certified a 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class action.175 
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded the class certification.176  
The Second Circuit recognized that the Simon II class certification 
presented the court with a case of first impression: certification of a 
mandatory, non opt-out stand-alone punitive damage class based on a 
limited-punishment theory.177  After canvassing the theories underlying 
both the limited-punishment and limited-generosity classes, the Second 
Circuit relied on neither construct to evaluate the certification of the 
Simon II punitive damage class.  Instead, the court analyzed the Simon II 
class certification pursuant to the stringent Ortiz requirements for 
certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class.178 
The Second Circuit held that the first fundamental requisite for 
limited-fund treatment under Ortiz was lacking, because there was no 
“evidence on which the district court may ascertain the limit and 
insufficiency of the limited fund.”179  Addressing the proposed fund, 
                                                     
 172. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 350 F.3d 360, 363 (3d Cir. 
1999) (describing 23(b)(1)(B) class settlement as “final and unappealable”). 
 173. See Hines, supra note 14, at 912 n.126. 
 174. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 184–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated 407 F.3d 125 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 175. Id. at 185 (“Rather, it is the Constitution through limits placed in total punitive damages 
which creates the limited fund.”). 
 176. In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 132, 134–36 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Second Circuit 
reviewed, at length, the district court’s reliance on emerging scholarship endorsing the limited-
punishment theory for certifying a punitive damage class pursuant to the Supreme Court’s punitive 
damage jurisprudence.  Id. 
 177. Id. at 132. 
 178. In so doing, the Second Circuit recognized that Ortiz “considered a set of circumstances 
quite unlike those in the instant case.”  Id. at 136. 
 179. Id. at 138. 
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based on a constitutional cap on punitive damages, the Second Circuit 
concluded: 
The proposed fund in this case, the constitutional “cap” on punitive 
damages for the given class’s claims, is a theoretical one, unlike those 
in the cases cited in Ortiz, where the fund was either an existing res or 
the total of defendants’ assets available to satisfy claims.  The fund here 
is—in essence—postulated, and for that reason it is not susceptible to 
proof, definition, or even estimation, by any precise figure.  It is 
therefore fundamentally unlike the classic limited funds of the 
historical antecedents of Rule 23.180 
The court further indicated that not only was the upper limit of the 
fund difficult to ascertain, but the record in the case did not provide any 
evidence that any given number of punitive damage awards to individual 
claimants would be “excessive, either individually or in the aggregate, 
and thus overwhelm the available fund.”181  Thus, without any evidence 
indicating the upper limit or insufficiency of the fund, class plaintiffs 
could not demonstrate that they would be prejudiced if left alone to 
pursue separate actions.182 
Having concluded that the Simon II class certification failed under 
Ortiz requirements, the Second Circuit additionally noted that the scope 
of the district court’s order, covering all punitive damage claims 
nationwide, violated Supreme Court guidelines in State Farm v. 
Campbell.183  The district court’s order had suggested that the Simon II 
class action could extend to “include punitive damages due to outrageous 
conduct by defendants towards non-class members.”184  The Second 
Circuit disagreed, holding that “State Farm made clear that conduct 
relevant to the reprehensibility analysis must have a nexus to the specific 
harm suffered by the plaintiff, and that it could not be independent of or 
dissimilar to the conduct that harms the plaintiff.”185  Therefore, harmful 
behavior that was not “‘correlatable’ with class members and the harm or 
potential harm to them would be precluded under State Farm.”186 
                                                     
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 138–39. 
 184. 211 F.R.D. 86, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (suggesting that the class might include passive 
breathers of smoke exhaled by others). 
 185. 407 F.3d at 139 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422–23 
(2003)). 
 186. Id. 
0.6.0_MULLENIX FINAL 5/10/2010  12:38:28 PM 
2010] NINE LIVES: THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLASS 875 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Second Circuit, in adopting the 
Ortiz traditional limited-fund model as its analytical construct, also 
endorsed the Supreme Court’s cautionary rhetoric eschewing 
adventuresome applications of Rule 23 “in ways that would have been 
beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the Advisory Committee 
Notes.”187  Because the Second Circuit concluded that the Simon II class 
failed to satisfy the Ortiz requirements for ascertaining a limited fund, 
the court did not address the additional appellate issues involved in the 
Simon II trial plan.188 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Simon II was the first direct 
application of Ortiz principles—coupled with the Supreme Court’s 
punitive damage jurisprudence—to a stand-alone punitive damage class.  
The Second Circuit married the punitive damage class to the traditional 
Ortiz model rather than adopting a limited-punishment or limited-
generosity theory in support of the punitive damage class.  In hewing 
closely to the traditional Ortiz mode of analysis, the Simon II decision 
seemed to have sounded the death knell for punitive damage classes. 
The Second Circuit vacated the Simon II punitive damage class 
certification in 2005.189  Two years later, in Philip Morris USA v. 
Williams, the Supreme Court handed down yet another decision 
discussing the constitutional limitations on jury instructions relating to 
punitive damages.190  In Williams, the Supreme Court held that the due 
process clause prohibits a jury from basing a punitive damage award in 
part on a desire to punish a defendant for injuries to people who were not 
parties to the action.191  However, the Court indicated that a jury might 
properly consider harm to others when evaluating the degree of a 
defendant’s reprehensibility.192 
                                                     
 187. Id. at 137 (citing Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 842 (1999)).  The Second 
Circuit, mindful that the Supreme Court had “counseled ‘against leniency in recognizing mandatory 
limited fund actions in circumstances markedly different from the traditional paradigm,’” held “that 
the first fundamental requisite for limited fund treatment is lacking here.”).  Id. at 137–38 (quoting 
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864). 
 188. Id. at 139–40 (declining to address whether the Simon II class violated the Rules Enabling 
Act, whether the court’s trial plan violated the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, whether it 
was impermissible for the court to employ a “fraud on the market” presumption for proof, whether 
the use of statistical sampling violated due process, and whether the district could resolve class 
claims by applying one state’s law). 
 189. Id. at 140. 
 190. 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007). 
 191. Id. at 1063. 
 192. Id. at 1063–64.  Stated somewhat differently, a jury could only consider harm to the named 
plaintiff when calculating the amount of punitive damages owed to the particular plaintiff and could 
not base that calculation on the jury’s understanding of broader harm to other nonparties who were 
not before the court in a particular case. 
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For some commentators, the Court’s pronouncements in Williams 
represented the ultimate nail in the coffin for the punitive damage 
class.193  The Court’s requirements for particularized punitive damage 
awards tied findings of harm to particular plaintiffs and doomed 
prospects of implementing punitive damage classes in the future: 
By stating that due process requires punitive damages to be based on 
harm to particular plaintiffs whose evidence is before the jury—neither 
the multiplier nor lump-sum approach allows the defendant to offer 
every available defense, nor provide sufficient information on the 
extent of harm to those other than the class representatives, such that 
the punitive damage award can be said to bear a “reasonable 
relationship” to compensatory damages.194 
Commentators also construed the Williams decision as undermining, 
if not invalidating, novel Jenkins-style reverse-bifurcated trial plans that 
supported certification of punitive damage classes in the past.195  Thus, if 
punitive damages may only be awarded based on prior findings of 
wrongdoing and compensatory damages, then, in theory, reverse-
bifurcated trial plans should not survive Williams. 
In spite of a growing consensus that Ortiz, Simon II, and Williams 
have doomed the punitive damage class, pronouncements of the death of 
the punitive damage class may once again be premature. 
IV. THE REVITALIZED ARGUMENTS FOR THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLASS 
AFTER ORTIZ 
A. The Revitalized Argument for a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) Punitive Damage 
Class 
As indicated above, although many commentators have viewed the 
Court’s decision in Williams as undermining the possibility of the 
punitive damage class, proponents find in Williams an arguable basis for 
the punitive damage class, especially when it is wedded to the classic 
                                                     
 193. See, e.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Punitive Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 880, 884 (2008) (arguing that 
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Williams, punitive damages cannot be pursued as a classwide 
remedy); Stier, supra note 63, at 433 (arguing that Supreme Court’s decision in Williams hastens the 
continuing demise of the mass-tort punitive damage class action with individualized issues such as 
causation, damages, and choice of law). 
 194. Stier, supra note 63, at 445–46. 
 195. See id.; see also Schwartz & Appel, supra note 63, at 375. 
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deterrent function of punitive damages.196  These commentators advocate 
certification of a traditional punitive damage class under Rule 
23(b)(1)(B).  In addition, these proponents find further support for the 
punitive damage class in Williams’s holding that a court can and should 
consider harm to others when evaluating the degree of reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s conduct.197 
Still other proponents acknowledge the obstacles to the punitive 
damage class raised by Ortiz, Simon II, and Williams, and the consequent 
difficulties of securing approval for a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited-fund class 
since these decisions.198  Instead, these advocates propose that the 
Supreme Court salvage the punitive damage class by articulating an 
exception to the historical limited-fund models endorsed in Ortiz.199 
The advocates for the traditional Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage 
class, then, would stand the Williams decision on its head and seize upon 
the Williams Court’s focus on harm to the individual plaintiff as 
validating the punitive damage class.  In this reading, attention is 
deflected away from the limited-punishment theory, which concerns 
excessive punishment on the defendant as a consequence of multiple 
punitive damage awards. 
The “focus-on-the-plaintiff” theory inspired by Williams leads to a 
bootstrap argument in support of the punitive damage class.  Pursuant to 
this argument, if the court’s focus is on harm to the individual plaintiff, 
then an excellent solution is to join lots of individual plaintiffs together 
in one action.  Thus, leading proponents of the punitive damage class 
have suggested: “If the Court’s focus, after Philip Morris [v. Williams], 
must remain on the harm to the individual plaintiff . . . then the 
procedural solution to preserving punitive damages’ classical deterrent 
function may lie in the aggregation of plaintiffs, via class action or other 
joinder mechanisms.”200  These advocates suggest: 
The obvious solution to the “punishment for harm to plaintiffs only” 
dictate of Philip Morris [v. Williams] is to bring more plaintiffs before 
the court, not only to assure that an adequate level of deterrence is 
                                                     
 196. See Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 412, 421–29. 
 197. This reprehensibility requirement derived from the Court’s prior holdings in BMW of North 
America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).  See Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Michael G. Nast, Commentary, A 
Plaintiff’s Perspective on the Effect of State Farm v. Campbell on Punitive Damages in Mass Tort, 3 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS, June 19, 2003, at 1 (discussing how reprehensibility factor 
articulated in State Farm supported punitive damage class). 
 198. Nagy, supra note 14, at 624. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 412. 
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approached, but to level the playing field in such a societally essential 
litigation arena by enabling plaintiffs to obtain at least some of the 
economies of scale of aggregate prosecution, and to lessen the odds that 
an egregiously reprehensible defendant will elude full accountability 
for large-scale misconduct.  If punitive damages are to stand as a civil 
penalty for the transgression of the social compact they must continue 
to sting, in order to perform their deterrent and exemplary functions.201 
The “more-plaintiffs-are-better” argument, based on the Court’s 
Williams decision, seems a non sequitur.  It appears quite a stretch to 
suggest that the Court’s focus on proving up harm to the individual 
plaintiff in Williams supports expansion of the Court’s holdings to 
embrace a punitive damage class. 
Proponents of the punitive damage class also argue that the Court’s 
continued endorsement of the BMW–State Farm reprehensibility factor 
supports classwide treatment of punitive damages.202  In this view, if 
harm to others is a key factor in determining reprehensibility—and the 
degree of reprehensibility is a key determinant in a jury’s decision to 
award punitive damages—then harm to others will always be an integral 
part of any punitive damages case.  In this view, the Court’s decision in 
State Farm v. Campbell suggests that all persons claiming harm from a 
reprehensible course of conduct should be included in a single 
proceeding to determine punitive damages under appropriate state law.203  
The class action, then, is the ideal procedural vehicle for assessing such 
harm to others. 
However, the Court’s continued endorsement of the reprehensibility 
factor in State Farm and Williams seems too slim a reed upon which to 
bootstrap justification for the punitive damage class.  The Court’s 
punitive damage pronouncements in BMW, State Farm, and Williams all 
occurred in lawsuits brought by individual plaintiffs.  None of those 
cases involved a class action for punitive damages.  Thus, in assessing 
liability for punitive damages, the reprehensibility factor enables a jury 
to consider evidence relating to nonparties to determine the level of 
reprehensibility (if any) of a defendant’s conduct in an individual 
lawsuit. 
                                                     
 201. Id. at 421. 
 202. See id. at 413–14. 
 203. Id. at 429.  Cabraser and Nelson concede, however, that if a classwide treatment of punitive 
damages is ever to survive appellate scrutiny, such a class would have to be based on a trial plan that 
resembled a traditional trial chronology of liability determination, compensatory damage 
determination, followed by punitive damage consideration.  See id. at 428–29. 
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But the reprehensibility factor is just that: a single factor in a 
complex jury determination in an individual lawsuit.  The fact that the 
Court’s decisions in State Farm and Williams permit juries to reference 
harm to others in assessing reprehensibility has nothing to do with 
whether a jury may consider harm to nonparties in calculating and 
determining individual punitive damage awards.  The Court clearly has 
indicated that this is constitutionally impermissible.  Hence, it remains 
entirely uncertain (if not dubious) whether the Supreme Court intended 
its endorsement of the reprehensibility factor, alone, to support 
endorsement of a classwide punitive damage procedural vehicle for the 
calculation and award of punitive damages. 
In a class action, individual claims are not “joined,” and the class 
action mechanism is not actually a joinder device.  Class action litigation 
is representational litigation, and, therefore, class members are not 
parties to the litigation in any formal sense, or before the court or the 
jury.  Absent class members are precisely that: absent.  Hence, the 
BMW–State Farm–Williams stricture against calculating a punitive 
damage award based on nonparties to the litigation is equally applicable 
to the class action context.  The mere aggregation of absent class 
members in a representational litigation does not actually bring these 
individual claims before the court. 
Other proponents of the punitive damage class concede that it is hard 
to imagine that the current Supreme Court would not consider a Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) mandatory punitive damage class “adventurous” after 
Ortiz.204  A commentator further concedes that, while Ortiz did not 
directly address the question of the punitive damage class certified under 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B), “the Court’s language impliedly disallows a departure 
from the rule’s traditional application.”205  Hence, class counsel seeking 
to certify a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class in the post-Ortiz era 
face considerable obstacles to proving up the requirements of a 
traditional limited-fund action.206 
Acknowledging the severe limitations imposed by Ortiz,207 
proponents nonetheless suggest that “utility and fairness suggest a need 
for the availability of such certification.”208  Based completely on public 
policy arguments, these advocates therefore suggest that the Supreme 
                                                     
 204. Nagy, supra note 14, at 615. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. at 616–24. 
 207. “[C]ertification of mandatory punitive damage classes may not be reconcilable with current 
legal precedent . . . .”  Id. at 624. 
 208. Id. 
0.6.0_MULLENIX FINAL 5/10/2010  12:38:28 PM 
880 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
Court revisit the issue of limited-fund class actions and make an 
exception from the traditional mandate in Ortiz when applying Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) to punitive damage classes.209  The public-policy rationales 
advanced in support of a punitive damage class exception are grounded 
in (1) fairness to plaintiffs (windfall awards violate distributive 
justice),210 (2) benefits to defendants (the limited generosity and limited 
punishment theories),211 and (3) efficiencies in resolving mass-tort 
litigation.212 
That the Supreme Court would depart from a rules-based analysis of 
the limited-fund class action to support an exceptional departure for the 
punitive damage class, based largely on policy rationales, seems 
improbable.  It should be remembered that the considerable policy 
rationales advanced in support of the global asbestos settlements in both 
Amchem and Ortiz failed to convince at least six Justices to resolve the 
mass-tort litigation crisis in the federal courts.213  Finally, even assuming 
that the Supreme Court granted review of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) punitive 
damage certification, multistate or nationwide mandatory class actions 
would still be vulnerable to Shutts challenges and choice-of-law issues.214 
B. The Revitalized Argument for a Rule 23(b)(3) Punitive Damage 
Class 
While some commentators have attempted to resuscitate the Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class, others have recognized that the Ortiz 
Court’s view “of a true limited fund have made the utility of Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) for obtaining class certification of a tort suit for damages 
very difficult.”215  These realists, then, have abandoned hope for the 
                                                     
 209. Id. 
It seems that the easiest way to facilitate a needed change in the law would be for the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari on this issue.  To achieve fairness and efficiency in 
mass tort litigation in the future, the Supreme Court should rethink Ortiz’s limitations on 
certification under 23(b)(1)(B).  By making an exception to the traditional application of 
the rule for mandatory punitive damage classes, courts will be able to grant certification 
on a limited fund theory—even when the fund is only theoretically limited by the legal 
limits on punitive damage liability. 
Id. at 629 (citation omitted). 
 210. Id. at 624–26.  Cf. Mesulam, supra note 14, at 1139–40 (debunking the “plaintiff-centric” 
myth of punitive damages). 
 211. Nagy, supra note 14, at 626–27. 
 212. Id. at 628. 
 213. Ortiz was a 7–2 decision and Amchem was a 6–2 decision with Justice O’Connor taking no 
part in the consideration of that case. 
 214. Nagy, supra note 14, at 629 n.218. 
 215. Underwood, supra note 1, at 783. 
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23(b)(1)(B) class, and instead have surprisingly shifted aspirations for 
the punitive damage class back to the 23(b)(3) arena.216  Thus, one 
advocate has suggested that the critical commentary suggesting that State 
Farm and Williams are hostile to the punitive damage class, “is certainly 
overstated if not misguided.”217  Viewing the Court’s punitive damage 
jurisprudence, this advocate concludes that, “[p]roperly understood, these 
authorities actually create pro-certification arguments that suggest a 
possible path for resurgence of the 23(b)(3) class action.  The Supreme 
Court may have inadvertently just breathed new life into the punitive 
damage class action.”218 
The gist of the argument is that a Rule 23(b)(3) class action solves 
the paradox raised by the Court’s mandate in Williams.  Thus, in 
ascertaining the degree of a defendant’s reprehensibility, the focus need 
not be limited to a particular claimant’s harm.219  However, a jury may 
consider harm to third parties only for the purpose of reprehensibility, 
not for the purpose of punishing the tortfeasor.220  Resort to class 
certification in mass-tort cases resolves this paradox.221  Victims of the 
tortfeasor’s misconduct are thereby converted from strangers into class 
members.222  The Supreme Court has determined that class members in a 
certified case are hardly strangers to the litigation and that the Due 
Process Clause protects their interests in class action proceedings.223 
Additionally, the issue of punitive damage liability for a mass 
tortfeasor is one shared in common by all claimants, supporting findings 
of commonality under Rule 23(a), and predominance under 23(b)(3).224  
And certification of a punitive damage class is superior to traditional 
one-on-one litigation when viewed through the prism of the multiple-
punishment concern.225 
Advocates of the Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage class further suggest 
that, as a matter of trial procedure, the Court’s punitive damage 
jurisprudence creates no barriers to trial courts bifurcating the punitive 
damage issue and allowing a jury in the first trial phase to enter a 
                                                     
 216. Id. at 796–806. 
 217. Id. at 796. 
 218. Id. at 797. 
 219. Id. at 798. 
 220. Id. at 801. 
 221. Id. at 802. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 797. 
 224. Id. at 798–99. 
 225. Id. at 800. 
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multiplier of punitive-to-actual damages.226  In subsequent individual 
trials, juries could rule on the merits of individual liability matters and 
determine each class member’s actual damages, thus permitting the trial 
court—upon engaging in State Farm-mandated analysis—to enter final 
judgment using the original jury’s punitive damage multiplier.227 
This brief on behalf of a revitalized Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage 
class is fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties.  As indicated 
above, the class action procedural mechanism is not a surrogate device 
for converting strangers to the litigation into parties.  If class members 
are properly characterized as nonparties, then the Williams stricture 
prohibiting an award of punitive damages based on reference to 
nonparties carries equal force in the class action context.  The 23(b)(3) 
class action does not, as suggested by its advocates, solve the so-called 
Williams paradox. 
Advocacy on behalf of the Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage class, as 
described above, rests on approval of Jenkins-style reverse-bifurcated 
trial plans, which have never been approved by the Supreme Court.  
Even leading plaintiffs’ class counsel now suggest that the Court’s 
evolving punitive damage jurisprudence probably does not support such 
reverse-bifurcated trial plans because punitive damages must be 
anchored to prior findings of compensatory damages.228  In addition, the 
complicated description of possible multiphase classwide and individual 
trials for compensatory and punitive damage awards undercuts 
arguments based in efficiency, economy, and superiority.229 
Moreover, recourse to the 23(b)(3) class category for certification of 
a punitive damage class raises the specter of other complicating problems 
not addressed by its proponents, such as choice-of-law issues in 
multistate and nationwide mass torts.  More than twenty-five years ago, 
federal courts suggested that nationwide punitive damage classes were 
not viable under 23(b)(3) because of applicable-law problems.230  This 
barrier to the 23(b)(3) punitive damages class action has not changed in 
the intervening years since the Dalkon Shield litigation. 
                                                     
 226. Id. at 804. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 428–29 (“[A] trial plan that most resembles a 
traditional trial chronology of liability determination, compensatory damage determination, and then 
punitive damage consideration, is most likely to withstand appellate scrutiny.”). 
 229. Bifurcated trial plans also raise serious constitutional issues under the Seventh 
Amendment’s Reexamination Clause.  See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750–51 (5th 
Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302–03 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 230. See, e.g., Dalkon Shield, supra note 3, 693 F.2d 847. 
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Additionally, Rule 23(b)(3) class actions require notice and the right 
to opt out of the class.  It is perhaps worth noting that an opt-out punitive 
damage class seems to undermine the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, 
and the judicial system.  A 23(b)(3) opt-out punitive damage class is 
inconsistent with the goal of avoiding punitive damage overkill.  Thus, a 
defendant in a 23(b)(3) opt-out punitive damage class gains little benefit 
from aggregating some of its punitive damage exposure, and instead runs 
the risk of individual litigants seeking multiple successive punitive 
damage awards in individual litigation.  This seems a likely reason why 
the Exxon Corporation sought certification of a 23(b)(1)(B) non-opt-out 
punitive damage class in the Exxon Valdez litigation. 
Conversely, a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class does not serve the interests 
of class plaintiffs.  Class members who opt out of a punitive damage 
class are then free to litigate their compensatory and punitive damage 
claims in individual litigation.  However, when faced with a pending 
parallel class action, this scenario might induce a race to the courthouse 
to accomplish punitive damage recovery.  The Third Circuit recognized 
the possibility of just such a race to the courthouse in the School 
Asbestos Litigation.231 
C. The Revitalized Argument for Punitive Damage Class Based on 
CAFA 
A third, and perhaps the most inventive, argument on behalf of the 
punitive damage class is anchored in the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (CAFA).232  As is well-known, CAFA created new original federal 
diversity jurisdiction for class actions, as well as a new removal 
provision for removing state class actions into federal court.  In addition, 
CAFA recognized the existence of “mass action” cases that also were 
subject to the statute’s removal provisions.233 
Proponents of the punitive damage class now suggest that CAFA’s 
provision for federal adjudication of “mass action” cases provides an 
effective vehicle for quasi-classwide adjudication of punitive damages, 
without the burdens of formal class certification.  In this sense, the 
CAFA mass-action provision presents an even better procedural 
opportunity for seeking aggregate punitive damages (if you are a 
                                                     
 231. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 232. Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 
1453 (Supp. 2007)). 
 233. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (stating a “mass action shall be deemed to be a class action 
removable” under (d)(2)–(10) if the requirements within those provisions are met). 
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plaintiff).  Thus, the advocates for this view argue that CAFA’s embrace 
of mass actions 
present[s] an intriguing format for the cost-effective determination of 
punitive damages liability and quantum to large numbers of plaintiffs in 
a single proceeding.  The class economies of scale are present, without 
the cost, delay, and risk of obtaining formal certification under Rule 23.  
Plaintiffs may be grouped in multiple mass actions, by type of claim, 
severity of injury, and other factors that maximize factual and legal 
commonality.  This facilitates a single jury’s evaluation of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct toward the group before the 
court, and the resulting harm to that group.  Thus, mass actions more 
nearly achieve the goal of deterrence and punishment than could 
scattered or sporadic single-plaintiff trials.234 
The CAFA mass-action theory is nothing if not creative.  Since its 
enactment, CAFA has come to be freighted with all sorts of proposed 
uses never intended by its authors.  One need not tarry over the CAFA 
argument, however.  There is nothing in the legislative history of CAFA 
to suggest that Congress, in referencing mass actions, intended to create 
a new aggregate litigation mechanism that would enable federal courts to 
adjudicate aggregate punitive damages, or to avoid class certification 
requirements.  The CAFA mass-action provision was included in the 
legislation to address a specific gap in the CAFA’s removal provisions. 
CAFA was intended to address abuses by state courts in handling 
state-based class actions.  To address these abuses, it is widely 
acknowledged that the primary purpose of CAFA was to provide a new 
removal statute to permit removal of state class actions into federal 
court.235  Forty-eight of the fifty states have class action rules or 
statutes;236 Mississippi and Virginia do not.237  However, procedural rules 
in both Mississippi and Virginia allow for the joinder of large numbers of 
individual claims.  CAFA’s removal provisions applied only to state 
class actions, and in absence of the mass-action provision, would not 
have reached aggregate litigation in those two states.  Hence, the mass-
                                                     
 234. See Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 4, at 430. 
 235. See H. Hunter Twiford, Anthony Rollo & John T. Rouse, CAFA Enunciates a New Burden 
of Proof Standard for Federal Jurisdiction, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP. (LRP Publications, 
West Palm Beach, Fla.) Aug. 9, 2006 (stating that Congress sought to “increase access to the federal 
courts for interstate class actions” with the adoption of CAFA). 
 236. See Linda S. Mullenix, STATE CLASS ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE xi (2007) 
(explaining that many states amended their approach to class action suits by enacting rules similar to 
the federal rules after the advisory committee amended Federal Rule 23). 
 237. See id. at 26,011 (Miss. § 103 (A)), 48,011 (Va. § 1.01) (stating that Mississippi and 
Virginia both have no civil procedure rule governing class action lawsuits). 
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action provision was included in CAFA to permit removal of aggregate 
litigation cases from Mississippi and Virginia state courts, the same as 
class actions in other states. 
CAFA’s mass-action provisions were not intended to create new 
forms of action that allow litigants to circumvent class certification 
requirements.238  It no doubt would come as a great surprise to the 
legislation’s sponsors to discover that CAFA’s mass-action provisions 
were now interpreted to provide a basis for aggregate resolution of 
punitive damages, outside the class action context. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As suggested at the outset of this Article, the concept of the punitive 
damage class action seems to enjoy nine lives: no matter how many 
times courts seem to repudiate the idea, or lay it to rest, the punitive 
damage class seems to spring back to life with renewed fervor.  
Notwithstanding its widely perceived death-knell in Ortiz and Simon II, 
the proponents of the punitive damage class nonetheless forge onwards 
with innovative theories in support of the punitive damage class.  Indeed, 
in sometimes hyperbolic rhetoric, proponents of the punitive damage 
class hail this concept as the twenty-first century salvation for mass tort-
litigation.239 
To date, very few punitive damage class actions have survived 
appellate scrutiny, and no punitive damage class has ever been subject to 
Supreme Court review.  However, there is merit to the academic 
contention that the Supreme Court’s punitive damage jurisprudence 
either is on a convergence or collision course with Rule 23.  Hence, the 
Supreme Court will be the ultimate arbiter of whether the punitive 
damage class is a viable mechanism, consistent with the Court’s 
constitutional punitive damage jurisprudence. 
Three scenarios, at least, suggest such possible review.  First, federal 
court approval or disapproval of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund under 
                                                     
 238. There is some merit to the point, however, that the Williams mandates would have more 
force in a simple joinder case where individual claims might be separately tried. 
 239. See Underwood, supra note 1, at 807 (“On the other hand, many commentators and courts 
are myopic in their failure to recognize in these decisions their demonstration of the superiority of 
the class action joinder device in Rule 23(b)(3) cases―a consequence that argues strongly for the 
enhanced utility of class actions in punitive damage cases.  In addition to providing systemic relief, 
the class device offers the best hope for a solution to the redundant punishment problem that was 
itself the original impetus for the Court’s initial foray into substantive due process for punitive 
damages and also renders moot the paradox of the strained Philip Morris procedural due process 
holding.  Properly viewed, the Supreme Court has offered a route back toward the viable use of the 
class action device for resolving mass punitive damage disputes.”). 
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Ortiz requirements would compel consideration of whether the Court 
ought to craft an exception to Ortiz, based on a limited-punishment or 
limited-generosity concept.  The Second Circuit’s rejection of the 
23(b)(1)(B) punitive damage class in Simon II, and the Ninth Circuit’s 
approval of the 23(b)(1)(B) class in Exxon Valdez, provided platforms 
for such review.  However, those certifications were not appealed to the 
Court for review.  Therefore, resolution of a possible Ortiz exception for 
punitive damage classes awaits further development in the lower federal 
courts. 
A second scenario that would inspire Supreme Court 
pronouncements regarding the punitive damage class would arise if 
lower federal courts were to embark on renewed certification of punitive 
damage classes under Rule 23(b)(3), marrying the (b)(3) class to the 
Court’s punitive damage jurisprudence.  Such punitive damage classes 
necessarily would implicate utilization of the historical Jenkins-style 
reverse-bifurcated trial plans, as the twenty-first century advocates for 
the punitive damage class suggest.  This prospect, then, would invite the 
Supreme Court to evaluate Jenkins-style reverse-bifurcated trial plans, on 
which the Court has not ruled to date. 
Rule 23(b)(3) punitive damage classes, however, may arise in 
factually distinct contexts that would further muddy evaluation of such 
class certifications.  Hence, both Jenkins and Watkins involved narrowly 
circumscribed classes that did not entail multistate applicable-law 
complications.  In contrast, sprawling nationwide mass torts certified 
under 23(b)(3) most likely would entail additional certification 
minefields—the requirements for predominance, superiority, and 
manageability. 
A third scenario that might invite Supreme Court review would be 
appellate approval or disapproval of a Rule 23(b)(2) punitive damage 
class.  As indicated above, the Dukes v. Wal-Mart litigation pending in 
the Ninth Circuit appears to be the most likely candidate to inspire such 
Supreme Court review.  This prospect would involve the Court not only 
in its punitive damage jurisprudence, but would lure the Court into 
resolving conflicting circuit court decisions on damages recovery in a  
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23(b)(2) class,240 as well as other long-simmering class action issues, 
such as notice and opt-out rights in mandatory classes. 
This much is certain: proponents of the punitive damage class—ever 
inventive and ever hopeful—will continue to pursue certification of such 
classes under all provisions of Rule 23.  The issue of the legitimacy of 
the punitive damage class is destined to be raised in a piecemeal fashion 
pursuant to every conceivable class certification category.  And 
consequently, it seems likely that the Court will be unable to articulate a 
unified theory of the punitive damage class that will apply to all cases, 
given the array of possible means for structuring the punitive damage 
class (as well as the array of underlying factual circumstances giving rise 
to such litigation).  Until the Court cycles through all possible variations 
of punitive damage class certification, it is difficult to envision a unified 
theory of the punitive damage class. 
Finally, a cautionary note.  If Ortiz is any guidance, the signal 
message from the Court is circumspection toward adventuresome use of 
Rule 23.241  If a conservative Court in Ortiz repudiated innovative efforts 
to solve the “elephantine” crisis of asbestos litigation in the courts 
through a settlement class, then it is difficult to contemplate an even 
more conservative Court now creating a new vehicle for a punitive 
damage litigation class pursuant to the 23(b)(1)(B) class category.  The 
same admonition against adventuresome applications of Rule 23 would 
seem to apply with equal force to the novel Jenkins-style trial plans of 
the 1990s.  Finally, shoe-horning the punitive damage class into the 
23(b)(2) category would require this conservative Court to endorse the 
liberal, innovative constructions of the 23(b)(2) category from the 
Second and Ninth Circuits. 
I don’t think so. 
 
                                                     
 240. A potential fourth opportunity for considering the punitive damage class certification could 
arise pursuant to a class certified under Rule 23(c)(4)(a), the so-called “limited-issues” class.  Hence, 
a district court conceivably could certify a punitive damage class for a determination of punitive 
damage liability or a punitive damage multiplier.  The Supreme Court has not, to date, decided a 
case construing the applicability of a limited-issues class.  The problem of the limited-issues class is 
itself a contested class action issue among the federal courts. 
 241. See In re Simon II, 407 F.3d 125, 137–38 (2d Cir. 2005) (adopting the Supreme Court’s 
cautionary approach to adventuresome uses of Rule 23, especially in the limited-fund class action, in 
repudiating the district court’s certification of a stand-alone mandatory punitive damage class). 
